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CRIME, WAR & ROMANTICISM:

ARTHUR ANDERSEN A N D THE NATURE OF ENTITY GUILT

David N. Cassuto *
"Our law has not gone so far in accepting that any antisocial
attitude is sufficient to justify criminal punishment."'
"Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience,
when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
ki~ked?"~

In 2002, Arthur Andersen, LLP stood trial for obstruction of
justice. The prosecution offered several theories as to who at
the firm had committed the crime but no one theory satisfied
all twelve jurors. In an attempt to break its deadlock, the
jury asked whether it could convict i f some jurors thought
Person A at Andersen had done it and some thought it was
Person B. Following argument, the judge ruled that it could
convict.
This article argues that the court's response to the jury's
query was wrong as a matter of law and policy. The ruling
misconstrues the nature of corporate criminal intent and
effectively treats a domestic corporate entity as if it were a
rogue nation facing trialfor war crimes. Part I offers a brief
history of Andersen's rise and fall. Part 11 examines
Andersen 's association with Enron and the events that led to
Andersen 's indictment and trial. Part 111analyzes the court's
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, B.A.,
Wesleyan University, J.D., University of California - Berkeley, Boalt Hall
School of Law, PhD, Indiana University. Thanks go to Bridget Crawford, Don
Doernberg & Ben Gershman for their insights and comments. Jessica Astrof,
Bill McNamara and Brenna Zortman provided stellar and invaluable research
assistance, as did Emily Collins. My beloved, Elizabeth Downes, made this
article both possible and better. If this is any good, it is because she is so
wonderful. Finally, my son and most appreciative reader, Jesse Yates Cassuto,
makes it all worth doing.
1
Sanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Case of Lady Eldon's French Lace
2
Edward, First Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England
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ruling on the jury's question and situates it within the nature
of entity guilt. Part IV contextualizes the dispute over
collective responsibility within a larger cultural context,
including the "War on Crime." The Conclusion and
Postscript offer some thoughts on the dangers - both present
and future - of our national obsession with war.
INTRODUCTION
The War on Crime has wrought considerable collateral damage.
Arthur Andersen, LLP ("Andersen"), former accounting giant and
scandal-rocked auditor of scandal-rocked corporations, hardly qualifies
~
as an innocent victim. A storied member of the "Big ~ i v e , "Andersen
was Enron7sauditor, providing both auditing, and consulting services to
the giant, Texas-based energy company. When Enron collapsed amidst
massive accounting fraud, Andersen faced investigation and public
excoriation. When it was later revealed that a group of people at
Andersen had engaged in a massive shredding operation, and that
millions of Enron-related documents had been destroyed, the firm faced
criminal charges. This hardly seems like a resume for victimhood.
Yet, the firm's 2002 trial for criminal obstruction of justice was
marred by serious procedural errors. The jury instructions contained
several crucial flaws, only one of which was addressed on appeal.4 It is
another major procedural error that forms the focus of this article.
Though it did not ultimately affect the verdict, the error nevertheless has

The "Big Eight," global accounting firms had compressed to five following a string of
mergers. When Andersen imploded, the remaining firms became known as "The Final
Four." See John P. Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB.L. REV. 2 11 , 214 (2003).
4
While Andersen's conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court in May, 2005, the
reversible error differs from the issue treated herein. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). According to the instructions, jurors did not have to
believe that the guilty agent consciously knew that her corrupt persuasion amounted to
an act of wrongdoing. The Court held that this instruction fundamentally misinterpreted
the statute. In my view, the Court correctly found that the jury was improperly
instructed as to how to interpret the phrase "knowingly " in conjunction with "corruptly
persuade" in 18 U.S.C.A. 1512 (2005). Andersen, 125 S. Ct. at 2135-36. However, this
article focuses on the related but discrete issue of whether the jury was properly
instructed that it did not need to unanimously agree on the identity of the guilty corporate
agent. As a practical matter, the Court's decision amounted to little more than a pyrrhic
victory for the company, which had long since ceased to operate in any significant
capacity.
Heinonline - - 1 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y

&

L. 1 8 0 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6

20061

Arthur Andersen and the Nature of Entity Guilt

far-reaching implications
corporations.

for

future

criminal

prosecutions

181

of

The error arose in response to the jury's query as to whether it had to
unanimously agree upon the identity of the Andersen agent who
obstructed justice. The court ruled that it did not. That ruling
effectively negated the requirement for jury unanimity that is the right of
every federal criminal defendant.' It further revealed a fundamental
misapprehension by both the judge and the prosecution regarding the
nature of corporate criminal intent. As a result, Andersen found itself
facing the possibility of a criminal conviction without a unanimous
verdict. Though this prospect was averted by the jury's eventual
consensus, the ruling created a disturbing precedent for future corporate
prosecutions and for due process in general.
This article argues that the court's response to the jury's question
was wrong as a matter of law and policy. It consists of four parts. Part I
offers a brief history of Andersen. Part I1 examines the circumstances
leading up to the trial and the events of the trial itself. Part I11 focuses
on Jury Note # 9, which requested the court's guidance on unanimity.
Part IV contextualizes the dispute over they jury's query within a larger
discussion of collective responsibility and its role in the "War on
Crime." The Conclusion and Postscript offer some thoughts on the
dangers-both present and future--of our national obsession with war.

See FED. R.CRIM.P. 31 (stating that a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict
unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the crime);
see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe
Justices of this Court have recognized, virtually without dissent, that unanimity is one of
the indispensable features of federal jury trial."); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740,
748 (1948) ("Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments apply").
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The willingness of the prosecution and the court to treat Andersen,
the incorporeal legal entity,6 as an entified, malevolent actor and its
agents like automata made strategic sense at the time. It also fits within
the rhetoric of war, which tends to entify nations and attribute to them a
malevolence that can only truly be found within the minds of
individuals. This bellicose rhetoric depicts the opponent as not just a
defendant but an enemy threatening the motherland. And, when dealing
with enemies of state, the niceties of due process often dwindle in
importance.
Personifying ideas and/or corporate entities in this manner resembles
the phenomenon of Associated Will-Rousseau's
characterization of
the process by which a single entity is abstracted from a group of
individuals, usually citizens of a n a t i ~ n . ~
One most often encounters
Associated Will in times of war and, indeed, much of international
criminal law is based on the notion of national identity and collective
guilt.8 As discussed below, Associated Will plays an important role in
wars between nations and international adjudications but has (or should
have) little applicability to internal conflicts. Incorporating it into
domestic criminal prosecutions undermines the rights and safeguards
that protect society against excesses of state vigilance.

Though Andersen was organized as a limited partnership rather than a corporation,
prosecutors treated it, for all intents and purposes, as a corporation. This approach is
congruent with the United States Code, 1 U.S.C. 5 1 (2000), the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
MANUAL5 8Al.l n.1 (1991), and legal
precedent; see United States v. AP Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 (1958). See also
Sterling P.A. Darling, Jr., Note, Mitigating the Impressionability of the Incorporeal
Mind: Reassessing Unanimity Following the Obstruction of Justice Case of United
States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 40 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 1625, 1642-3 & n.109 (2003)
(noting same). Indeed, Andersen, the legal entity, fits within the broader definition of a
corporation as "[A] group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal
rules into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from the natural
365 (8th ed. 2004).
persons who make it up. . . ." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
See GEORGE
P. FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR36-37 (2002); George P. Fletcher, The
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 11 1
YALEL.J. 1499, 1509 (2002). This article owes a tremendous intellectual debt to
Professor Fletcher. My attempt in Part IV to describe the theory of collective guilt that
emerged from the Andersen trial as the product of a rhetorical strategy derived from a
neo-Romantic worldview draws heavily on Fletcher's elegant contrast between the
Romantic and Liberal visions of selfhood and their respective relationships to the notion
of collective guilt.
See MARCELLUS
DONALD
A.R. VON REDLICH,
THELAWOF NATIONS
14 (1 937) (The law
of nations, is concerned only with States, and not with the individual citizens or subjects
thereof and these States are considered to have "rights" and "duties.").
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANDERSEN
Arthur Andersen founded the firm with partner Clarence DeLany in
1913. DeLany left in 1918 and was replaced by Andersen's brother,
Walter, who departed in 1932. During the firm's early years, Arthur
Andersen, the individual, emerged as a powerful voice for probity and
candor in public accounting. The firm's burgeoning reputation as a
company that placed duty to the public above all else derived primarily
from the personality and pronouncements of its founder.
Stories about Arthur Andersen's uncompromising honesty became
legend, told and retold for decades following his death in 1947. One oftrepeated story related how a client had demanded that Andersen alter its
audit certification to cover up the client's distortion of his company's
earnings. Andersen refused, replying: "There is not enough money in
the city of Chicago to induce me to change the report."9 Other stories
abounded, each testifying to Andersen's rigid allegiance to the highest
business ethics. As the firm emerged as the gold standard for integrity
among public auditing companies, its fame (and that of its founder)
eclipsed even that of Jake "Greasy Thumb" Guzik, Chicago's other
famous accountant, whose notoriety derived primarily from his principal
client, A1 capone.''
One of Arthur Andersen's signature innovations was to indoctrinate
people into the firm early in their careers. The goal was to turn them
into "Androids"-as
they later became known-for
life. The fm
recruited people right out of college and trained them at an Andersen
training facility, schooling them in how to live as well as initiating them
into the accounting profession. It instructed them on what to wear,
where to eat, how to behave, and most importantly, how to conduct
public audits in the Andersen way."
Arthur Andersen quoted in SUSANE. SQUIRES,ET AL., INSIDE ARTHUR ANDERSEN:
SHIFTING
VALUES,
UNEXPECTED
CONSEQUENCES
32 (2003).
10
See BARBARA
LEYTOFFLER,
FINALACCOUNTING:
AMBITION,
GREEDAND THE FALLOF
ARTHURANDERSEN
14-15 (Broadway Books 2003). Andersen's reputation also received
a major boost when he and his firm were hired to audit the books of the legendary
utilities magnate, Samuel Insull. See DAVIDSKEEL,ICARUSIN THE BOARDROOM
88
(2005). Insull, who had started out as Thomas Edison's amanuensis, rose to become one
of the most powerful businessmen in the country. Id. at 81. As it turned out, much of the
fuel for his rapid rise lay in sketchy business practices that led to his downfall. Id. at 88.
Andersen's brilliant and forthright job of auditing Insull's companies in the aftermath of
their collapse solidified his and the firm's reputation for integrity. Id.
1I
See TOFFLER,
supra note 8, at 25-33.
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The idea was that companies would hire Arthur Andersen, LLP, not
individuals at the firm. It did not matter who actually conducted the
audit; every member of the firm performed audits in the same way. The
quality of service, like the color of employees' shirts, was uniform
throughout the world. In addition, when Androids left the firm, they
retained a powerful institutional loyalty that created new relationships
throughout the business world.'*
For most of the firm's existence, Arthur Andersen, LLP stood
proudly atop the auditing world as a paragon of business ethics and rigid
adherence to law. The firm was also famous for its strong hierarchy and
insular culture that demanded conformity to secure advancement. Over
time, however, the firm devolved into a profit-driven, unscrupulous
enterprise that privileged client satisfaction and revenue generation over
safeguarding the public trust.

1. Business Consulting Comes Into Its Own

As Andersen grew into a worldwide partnership and the largest of
the public accounting firms, the Android tradition began showing signs
l 2 For example, "[flrom 1989-2001, eighty-six people left Andersen to work for Enron.
Andersen alumni at Enron included . . . its chief accounting officer; . . . Enron's
treasurer; and Sherron Smith Watkins, the vice president who unsuccessfully tried to
blow the whistle on Enron's aggressive accounting." Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and
Andersen-What Went Wrong and Why Similar Audit Failures Could Happen Again, in
ENRON:CORPORATE
FIASCOSAND THEIRIMPLICATIONS
155, 160 (Nancy B. Rapoport &
Bala G. Dharan eds. Foundation Press 2004) (footnote omitted). This was typical of
Andersen's relationships with its clients. The continual exchange of personnel between
audit firms and their clients has been partially addressed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which bars audit firms from performing audit services for any public company whose
"chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, or
any person serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was employed by that
registered independent public accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the
audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding the date of the initiation of the
audit." 15 U.S.C. 5 78j-l(1) (2002).
However, while the Act also requires that the lead auditor on audit engagements rotate
every five years (15 U.S.C. 78Cj-I)), it does not (and arguably cannot) address the
unconscious bias that auditors likely feel for companies staffed by their alumni. See
SKEEL,supra note 8, at 188 (citing study showing that when a company chooses an
auditor, the auditor's judgment is distorted if she considers the company to be her client;
auditors were 30% more likely to find that a company's accounting conformed with
GAAP if they believed that the company rather than a third party had hired them to do
the audit).
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of strain. A schism emerged in the 1950s between the firm's consulting
group, which helped companies organize their financial and accounting
systems, and the firm's auditors, who determined whether a company's
accounting systems were accurate and trustworthy. The resulting
tension was both financial and philosophical.
Simply juxtaposing the two groups' respective missions highlights
their inevitable conflict. For an audit firm pledged to impartially
evaluate the finances of public companies to help those same companies
design their financial management systems makes the firm both author
and evaluator of its clients' accounting systems. All of the major
accounting f m s wrestled with this embedded conflict and it became a
potent source of contention with the SEC. By openly and vociferously
opposing the efforts of the SEC to rein in consulting services offered by
audit firm^,'^ Andersen and its sister firms successfully blocked
meaningful reform of the auditorlclient relationship until the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.'~
In the view of the Andersen partnership, the chief conflict between
audits and consulting lay in the parceling of profits. By the 1970s, the
consulting wing of the firm was generating more profits per partner than
the audit branch.'* Much haggling ensued as the firm acclimated to a
new era where audits no longer formed the firm's profit center.16
Adapting to this new reality required a seismic shift in the firm's selfimage and culture. Ultimately, that shift proved too much and, in 1997,
Andersen Consulting (later, "Accenture") separated from Andersen in an
See SQUIRES,
ET. AL, supra note 7, at 1 15-18; TOFFLER,
supra note 8 .
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 1 1 , 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). Among other
l3

l4

reforms, the Act bars accounting firms from performing consulting and audit work for
the same client. The effectiveness of the Act has yet to be h l l y assessed, although many
commentators feel that it did not do enough to change the systemic problems within the
public accounting sphere. For detailed analysis of the both the law and its implications,
see Lucci, supra note 1.
l5 See TOFFLER,
supra note 8, at 73.
l 6 This shift in revenue generation was not solely an Andersen phenomenon; it was
occurring industry-wide. SKEEL,supra note 8, at 166.
In 1976, more than 70% of the major accounting firms' revenue came
from profits. By 1998, this number had plummeted to 38%.
Accounting firms that had achieved prominence by developing an
international reputation for their audits . . . started to look like
consulting companies that did a little auditing on the side.
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acrimonious split that catapulted the firm from the largest in the Big 5 to
the smallest and least profitable.'7
As Andersen scrambled to recreate its in-house business consulting
Cross-selling
services and maximizing billables became a mandatory part of every
partner's client relations.I8 Partners were rewarded with points, which
translated into money, regardless of the risky nature of the client services
they sold.I9

arm, revenue issues became more and more urgent.

Disaster did not tarry long in coming. By the late 1990s, the
headlines regularly featured Andersen clients engulfed in major fraud
investigations.

2. Andersen Clients Embroiled in Accounting Fraud
During the period surrounding the turn of the millennium,
Andersen's clients seemed to follow one another into high-profile
collapse. Some examples include:
Baptist Foundation of America
Baptist Foundation of America ("BFA"), a non-profit charitable
organization and Andersen client, imploded in 1999. Thousands of
elderly investors lost millions of dollars in savings. Despite multiple
warnings that the organization was operating an enormous Ponzi
scheme, Andersen had continued to endorse BFA's accounting.20 In
1996, one of BFA's accountants even wrote the CEO that he "[did] not
believe that our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, would have us conduct
His business in a manner that withholds important information from our
investor^."^' Approximately 13,000 elderly investors lost $590 million
in retirement savings. For its failure to properly manage the company's

See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud & Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's
Perspective, 76 U . COLO.L. REV. 57,89-90 (2005) ("By 1999, Andersen had the smallest
auditing business of the Big Five accounting firms, with the slowest rate of growth.").
I8
See generally TOFFLER,
supra note 8, at 123-24.
l9 ~ e e , i dat. 111-12.
The same Andersen partner responsible for BFA had also supervised audits of one of
Charles Keating's failed savings and loans in the late 1980s, an engagement for which
supra note 8, at 153.
Andersen paid a $24 million dollar settlement. See TOFFLER,
See id. at 152-53.
I'

*'

''
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audits, Andersen paid a civil penalty and $2 17 million to settle lawsuits
brought by defrauded investors.22
Sunbeam Corporation
"Chainsaw Al" Dunlap took over Sunbeam Corporation
("Sunbeam") in 1996 ostensibly to restructure the business and restore it
to profitability. According to the SEC, Dunlap created an illusion of
success through fraudulent accounting.23 Sunbeam restated its earnings
for 1997 and 1998 and reduced its earnings from $109.4 million to $38.3
million. Sunbeam's stockholders filed suit against several company
officials as well as an Andersen partner who had managed the account.
According to Deloitte & Touche, which did the forensic accounting
following the restatements, Dunlap overstated Sunbeam's losses in 1996
and then overstated the company's gains in 1997-98. The SEC opined
that Andersen should never have signed off on Sunbeam's flawed
financial statements-statements which in its view amounted to fraud.24
Andersen maintained that it had acted appropriately. The firm settled
civil claims with Sunbeam shareholders by agreeing to a $1 10 million
dollar settlement."
Waste Mana~ement,Inc.
Waste Management, Inc. ("WMI"), a rollup collection of garbage
disposal companies was a blue chip corporate success story during the
1970s and 1980s. Andersen had served as the company's auditor since
before it went public in 1971.26 Over time, WMI overextended itself and
began inflating the value of its assets and undervaluing expenses.
Andersen auditors suggested but did not insist that the company correct
its accounting errors. WMI declined.
A subsequent SEC investigation in 1997-98 led WMI to restate $1.5
billion in revenues. At the time it was "the largest earnings restatement
22

See SQUIRES,
ET. AL, supra note 7, at 1 18.
See Jennifer G . Hill, Deconstructing Sunbeam-Contemporaly Issues in Corporate
Governance, 67 U . CIN.L.REV.1099, 1124-25 (1999).
24
See Cease-and-Desist Order, Accounting & Audit Enforcement Act Release No. 1393,
2001 WL 616627 (May 15, 2001); see also Ira L. Konel et al., The Interplay Between
LAWINST. 477, 619
Intellectual Property (IP) and Sarbanes-Oxley, 824 PRACTISING
(Mar. - May, 2005).
25
See SQUIRES
ET AL., supra note 7, at 119-20.
26
See TOFFLER,
supra note 8, at 145.
23
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in history."27 WMI's restatement badly tarnished Andersen's reputation.
The firm's public image was further sullied when Andersen's records
revealed that members of the firm knew of WMI's accounting problems
even as Andersen was endorsing WMI's fraudulent financial

statement^.^'
In June of 2001, Andersen entered into a consent decree against the
firm and three of its partners. It admitted no wrongdoing but was
"enjoined from further violations of the securities laws and fined $7
million."29 An injunction of this nature might have provided a sobering
reality check for Andersen and engendered an overdue review of its
policies. Sadly, it did not.
Instead, Andersen's response to the WMI debacle was to draft a
document retention policy that later played an important role in the
Enron debacle.
The policy aimed to ensure that potentially
incriminating documents were not preserved unnecessarily.30 One of the
policy's authors was a former member of the WMI engagement team.31
The parade of headline grabbing corporate scandals involving
Andersen clients did not end with WMI. In addition to Enron, Global
Crossing, Qwest Communications, and WorldCom all collapsed, as did
numerous other companies.32 This litany makes clear that the propensity
to overlook major accounting irregularities at Enron was far from an
isolated anomaly. It formed part of a larger problem of business ethics
that infused the entire firm, slowly eroding its reputation and ability to

27 Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of the Government's Anger, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2002, at A l .
28 See Bany Tarlow, RICO Report, CHAMPION
51, 52-54 (June 2005).
29 United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2002). The injunction against further violations played a key
role in later plea negotiations regarding Enron. Andersen simply could not admit to
another violation of securities laws without endangering its license to audit public
companies.
30 see Tarlow, supra note 26, at 52-54. See generally SQUIRES
ET AL., supra note 7, at
120-22.
3 1 See TOFFLER,
supra note 8, at 149.
32 SQUIRES,
supra note 7 at 123.
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service public companies.33Nowhere were the firm's systemic problems
more evident than in its relationship with Enron.

11. ENRON AND ANDERSEN
A. THE PRELUDE
Enron's bankruptcy filing on December 2, 2001 was the largest in
the history of the United
It came on the heels of Enron's
disclosure that it had overstated its profits for the previous five years by
33 Both TOFFLER,
supra note 8, passim, and SQUIRES
ET AL., supra note 7, passim, give
blow by blow descriptions of the collapse of the f m ' s ethics. Andersen's culture and its
involvement in so many of the worst accounting scandals in history played a significant
role in the government's decision to indict the firm. For a view from a prosecutorial
perspective, see Kroger, supra note 15, at 87-88 (2005). Kroger minces no words in his
indictment of Andersen's recent history leading up to and subsequent to Emon:

Andersen's failure to protect Emon investors was not an isolated
incident. . . . From 1992 to 1997, for example, Andersen helped
Waste Management. . . improperly inflate its eamings by $1 billion. .
. . Andersen was also involved in deceptive accounting at McKessonHBOC (eamings inflated by $300 million), Qwest (earnings inflated
by $1.2 billion), and WorldCom (earnings inflated by $9 billion) as
well. This pattern of misconduct . . . suggests that Andersen's failures
in the Enron case were . . . the result of a pervasive firm culture that
repeatedly valued the interest of management in positive eamings
statements over the interest of the shareholders and investing public
in accurate information.
Id.
The Department of Justice was cognizant of Andersen's checkered history. In
announcing the firm's indictment, Deputy Attorney General Thompson stated that the
"firm's history of wrongdoing" was a factor in the decision to indict.
See JOANMCPHEE& PETERL. WELSH,THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE'SGUIDELINES
FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF BUSINESSORGANUAT~ONS
AND RELATEDISSUES 3 (2003),

http://www.ropesgray.com/files/tbl~s20Newso5CFieUpoad116%5C267%5CArticle~J
une%205%202003~The%2ODepa~nt%20ofO/o2OJustices%20Guidelines%20for0/o2Oth
e%20Prosecution%2OofD/o20Business%2OOrganizations%2Oand%20Related%2OIssues~
McPhee-Welsh.pdf; see also Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney
Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States
Attorneys, Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cfif/corporate_guidelines.htm (noting that "[a]
corporation, like a natural person is expected to learn from its mistakes. A history of
similar conduct may be probative of a corporate culture that encouraged, or at least
condoned, such conduct. . . .").
34 In re Enron Corp., 284 B.R. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Claims against the corporation
exceeded $400 billion. However, WorldCom's bankruptcy in 2002 surpassed even
Enron's. See In re WorldCom, Inc., No.02-13533, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1401 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 31,2003). Ironically, Andersen had served as WorldCom's auditor as well.
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nearly $600 million.35 Andersen was Enron's auditor, providing both
auditing and consulting services. Among its other duties, it had annually
certified that Enron's financial disclosures complied with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, or "GAAP."~~ Consequently, the
fallout from Enron's collapse amid allegations of massive fraud and
deceptive business practices quickly enveloped Andersen as well.
The scandal metastasized in January 2002 when Andersen disclosed
that members of its Houston office (which serviced Enron) had ordered
employees to shred a great deal of information related to the firm's
dealings with Enron. Worse still, much of the shredding took place
when federal investigations of Enron had already commenced and when
Andersen had reason to know that an investigation of its own role in
Enron's collapse was imminent.
Andersen's involvement in Enron's financial mismanagement
became a secondary matter as both Congress and the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigated Andersen's potential
criminal liability for the shredding. The activities of Andersen and
Enron during the latter part of 2001 and the first third of 2002, which led
up to Andersen's subsequent criminal trial, are chronicled briefly below.
I . A Problem in Houston
On August 20, 2001, Sherron Watkins, a former Andersen employee
and current Enron executive, called an Andersen partner named Jim
Hecker to discuss her concern that Enron was improperly booking some
of its transaction^.^' Specifically, Watkins worried that the company
was using third party special purpose entities to inflate its earnings and

35 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Admits to Overstating Profits by
Nov. 9, 2001, at C l .
About $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
36 GAAP prohibits auditors from "expressing an opinion or stating affirmatively that
financial statements or other financial data 'present fairly . . . in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles,' if such information contains any departures
from accounting principles promulgated by a body designated by the AICPA [American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants] Council to establish such principles." See
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html(last visited Jan. 30, 2006) (quoting the
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct).
37 Memorandum from James A. Hecker, Partner, Arthur Andersen, to David B. Duncan
et al., Arthur Andersen 4 (Aug. 21,2001),
hap://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron~ander~en082102mem0.pdf.
[hereinafter
Hecker memo].
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disguise the magnitude of its debt.38 Following their conversation,
Hecker wrote a memo to the files that he also forwarded to David
Duncan, the lead partner on the Enron audit engagement.39 Shortly
thereafter, the firm formed a special group tasked with sorting out
possible concerns arising from the firm's involvement with Enron. That
group included Nancy Temple, an in-house attorney in Andersen's
Chicago office, who had only recently joined the firm.
In October 2001, Andersen learned that Enron intended to report
charges against income of approximately $1.2 billion in its third quarter
financial statements.
On October 9, prior to Enron's public
announcement, Temple wrote in her notes that a Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigation was "highly probable.'*0
On October 12, Enron sent Duncan a draft press release describing the
losses as "non-recurring." Duncan noted in a memo to the files that he
had advised against such language because investors could either
misconstrue or misunderstand it.41 He sent a draft of his memo to
Temple with a request for

2. Andersen Attempts Damage Control
On October 12, Temple sent the first in a series of ernails that were
to loom very large during the trial. In an email to David Duncan,
Temple recommended that he "consider reminding the Engagement
Team of [the firm's] document and retention policy. It will be helpful to
make sure that we have complied with the policy.'"3 Prosecutors

See William C. Powers, Jr. et a]., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 172-174 (Feb. 1, 2002),
http:Nnews.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport~sicreportO20102.pdf.
The document
is commonly known as the "Powers Report."
39 See Hecker memo supra note 35.
40 W. Amon Burton, Jr. & John S. Dzienkowski, Reexamining the Role of In-House
FIASCOS
&
Lawyers After the Conviction of Arthur Andersen in ENRON: CORPORATE
THEIRIMPLICATIONS
689, 695 (Nancy B.Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, eds. Foundation
Press 2004).
41
Memorandum from David B. Duncan to The Files on Enron Press Release Discussion,
http:Nnews.findlaw.com/hdocs/docslenron/dncn2fies 101501 mem.pdf (last visited Aug.
1,2005).
42
E-mail from Nancy A. Temple to David B. Duncan (Oct. 16, 2001 8:39 PM),
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/enr0n/tmp12dunc101601eml.pdf (last visited Aug. 2,
2005). [hereinafter, Memo to the Files on Enron Press Release Discussion].
43 Temple's email is included as an appendix to Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38 at
750.
38
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claimed that the timing of the email indicated that Temple's language
amounted to a coded directive to shred as many documents as possible.44
Temple's reply email to Duncan on October 16 regarding Enron's
draft press release also became central to the disposition of the case. In
it, Temple made a number of suggestions with respect to Duncan's
memo, including:
deleting any reference to Temple or consultations with the legal
group so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege and to
reduce the likelihood that she (Temple) "might be a witness,
which [she] prefer[ed] to avoid."
deleting language that "might suggest that we [Andersen] have
concluded the release is misleading.. ." and
noting that she would consult further with Andersen's legal
group to see if the firm should take other measures to protect
itself from potential liability.45
Enron overrode Duncan's concerns and included the phrase "nonrecurring" in the final version of the press release.46 Meanwhile, fiom
October 12 through November 9, 2001, Andersen employees shredded
millions of Enron-related documents in its files. On November 8,
Andersen received a subpoena from the SEC requesting all documents
relating to its work on behalf of Enron. The following day, Duncan
directed his assistant to send out a mass email to all employees working
on Enron matters. The subject line of the email read, "No more
shredding.'*'
In January 2002, Andersen hired the law firms of Davis Polk &
Wardwell and Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw to help sort out the
partnership's responsibilities stemming from the Enron debacle. It
quickly became apparent that many documents, emails and other
information that were potentially responsive to the SEC subpoena were
missing and likely destroyed. Andersen publicly disclosed this

Id. at 696-97.
See Memo to the Files on Enron Press Release Discussion, supra note 40.
46 See id.
47 Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 696-97. However, Duncan's assistant,
Shannon Adlong testified that the email and its heading were her idea. See Tom Fowler,
Duncan Aide Tearfully Tells of Boss's Firing, HOUSTONCHRON.,June 15, 2002,
available at http:Nwww.chron.comlcs/CDA/ssistory.inplspecialandersed1434968(last
visited Aug. 9, 2005).
44

45
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information in a press release dated January 10, 2002. Five days later,
Andersen fired David Duncan.
At this point, it began to look like Andersen might be indicted on
criminal charges for obstruction of justice. Protracted plea negotiations
with the DOJ eventually broke down and, on March 7, the firm was
indicted by a federal grand jury in Houston. On April 6, David Duncan
pled guilty to felony obstruction of justice charges.48 In his plea,
Duncan admitted knowing that the SEC might have been interested in
the documents that he ordered destroyed.49 He also admitted personally
destroying some of the documents.50
Andersen's case was set for trial for May 7, 2002. The firm faced
charges of criminal obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. $1512,
specifically section (b) (2), the witness tampering provision, which states
in relevant part:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force,
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to
(2) cause or induce any person to
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document,
or other object, from an official proceeding;

(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for

See Cooperation Agreement, United States v. David Duncan (S.D.T.X. 2002),
h t t p : / / n e w s . f m d l a w . c o m ~ h d o c s l d o c s / e ~ . p (last
d f checked Aug. 9,
2005).
49
See id. See also, Tom Fowler, Ex-Andersen Auditor Pleads Guilty, HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Apr. 9,2002,available at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDNssistory.mpl/special/andersedl434968.
50 See id.
48
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use in an official proceeding . . . shall be [guilty of a
crime].51
In order to convict, prosecutors had to show that someone at
Andersen had either attempted or actually had "corruptly persuaded"52
another person to tamper with material relevant to an official
proceeding. The narrowness of the charge presented a challenge to
prosecutors. They had to prove more than just corporate malfeasance;
they instead had to show that a specific Andersen agent committed a
specific act--corruptly persuading-and that said act caused or intended
to cause another person to impede official access to material relevant to
the investigation.53
Prosecuting and convicting corporations poses many challenges,
including obvious hurdles to successfully imputing intent and actions to
incorporeal legal entities. Over the years, several methods have arisen

'' 18 U.S.C. $ 1512 (b)(2) (2005).

Following the raft of accounting scandals of the last
several years, Congress revised $1512 as part of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 18 U.S.C. $
1512(c) now includes a provision prohibiting individuals from corruptly altering,
destroying, or concealing a document with the intent to impede its use un an official
proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1512(c)(l). Section 1512(c)(2) is even more sweeping. It
prohibits individuals from corruptly obstructing, influencing or impeding any official
proceeding or attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. $ 1512(c)(2). The broad scope of this
language seems to cover virtually any interference with official proceedings. See Keith
Palfin & Sandhya Prabhu, Obstruction of Justice, 40 AM. CFUM.L. REV. 873,899 (2003).
The amendments to $1512 (and Sarbanes-Oxley in general) have received mixed
reviews. One commentator notes that the law was enacted so quickly and with so little
discussion that the end result is a disorganized hodgepodge that amounts to little more
than political grandstanding. See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Afermath:
Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST.
JOHN'SL. REV. 67 1,672 (2002).
Courts have struggled with the meaning of "corruptly persuade." See, e.g., United
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (defining corrupt persuasion as
persuasion with "improper purpose"); United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d
' for "improper purposes" renders the term superfluous
Cir. 1997) (defining ' ~ & ~ t l ~ ' as
when statute already has intent requirement); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289,
1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (following Thompson to find "corruptly persuading" means
persuade for improper purposes and phrase is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
In reversing Andersen's conviction, the Supreme Court noted that "corruptly" is
commonly associated with "wrongful, immoral, or depraved" behavior but declined to
explicitly define the term, observing that "[tlhe outer limits of this element need not be
explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite
consciousness of wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct 2 129,
2136 (2005).
The jury instructions, which lay out the prosecution's burden can be found infra at
note 82.

'*

''
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for prosecuting collective entities, including respondeat superior and the
''co11ective knowledge" doctrine.54 Each doctrine is examined briefly
below.
Most corporate criminal liability stems from the notion of
respondeat superior; a doctrine holding corporations liable for the
actions and intentions of their agents.55 Courts interpret this to mean that
a corporate entity is responsible for criminal acts carried out by an agent
if that agent was acting within the scope of employment and with the
intent to benefit the c ~ r p o r a t i o n .This
~ ~ principle is generally read
broadly to include actions taken by agents in specific contravention to
the instructions of their superiors but which nonetheless aimed to further
the good of the c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ~ ~
The "collective knowledge" doctrine is a more recent and
controversial method for obtaining criminal conviction^.^^ Under this
principle, entity intent may be divined through imputing to the corporate

54 Other methods for determining intent include willful blindness as well as methods
relating to conspiracies, liability following mergers and dissolutions, and misprision of
felony. Since these are not relevant to the Andersen case, I do not discuss them here.
" S e e e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495
(1909) (holding that corporations may be "held responsible for and charged with the
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon
them.").
j6 See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) (finding
partnership liable for acts committed by its agents acting within the scope of their
employment); In re Hellenic, Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding an agent's
knowledge may be imputed to a corporation where "agent is acting within the scope of
his authority and where the knowledge relates to matters within the scope of that
authority"). For further discussion, see Annie Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability,
39 AM. CRIML. REV. 327 (2002); Jonathan C. Poling & Kimberly Murphy White,
Corporate Criminal Liability, 38 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 525 (2001).
57 See United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989) (afirming
corporation's conviction although the agent who committed the crime was expressly
advised by supervisor that the corporation did not countenance illegal behavior); United
States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that
the fact employees' actions were illegal and contrary to corporate policy "does not
absolve [defendant] of legal responsibility for their acts"); see also Dan K . Webb, et. al.,
Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW
617, 624 (1994) ("[Elven when an employee acts contrary to compliance program
olicies and specific directives, the corporation can be held criminally liable.")
See, e.g., PETERA. FRENCH,COLLECTIVE
AND CORPORATE
REsmNsIBILIrn 1 (1984)
("The idea of collective, let alone corporate responsibility has been frequently and loudly
decried as a vulgarism and red-lined from residency in the better moral
neighborhoods.").
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entity the sum of the knowledge of all of its employees.59 Corporations
often evade liability by compartmentalizing responsibility. This strategy
prevents any one person from knowing the fill extent of the criminal
activity. Therefore, no one employee attains the requisite mens rea for
the crime alleged. To combat this tactic, courts have reasoned that "[tlhe
aggregate of those components represents the corporation's knowledge
of a particular operation."60 If no one employee had the necessary intent
or knowledge for a given criminal act but each had the intent to carry out
part of the crime, then their respective intents and actions can be
aggregated into one collective intent and action for which the
corporation may be prosecuted.
In the Andersen case, the judge specifically excluded collective
knowledge as a means of convicting the firm.61 Consequently,
prosecutors had to rely solely on respondeat superior. This meant that
the jury needed to unanimously conclude that a particular agent
knowingly and corruptly persuaded others to obstruct justice.
Nevertheless, following a query from the
prosecutors sought to
inject a novel interpretation of collective knowledge into the jury
deliberations. And, despite her earlier instructions and a highly
questionable legal rationale, the judge permitted it.
The judge's ruling, as well as the prosecution's rationale. constituted
a radical departure from traditional theories of corporate criminal
liability. Appreciating the controversial nature of the ruling requires
contextualizing it within the trial. The next section reviews the events
leading up to the jury's query.

'' United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987); see also United
States v. F m & Home Sav. Ass'n, 932 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
when multiple employees participate in illegal activities, knowledge of those activities
may be imputed to employer); United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 91 1 F2d 833, 843
(1st Cir. 1990) (imputing various employees' knowledge gained during course of
employment to employer). Other methods for determining intent irrelevant to the
Andersen case are not discussed here.
60 Bank of New England, 821 F2d at 856.
Transcript of Proceedings at 6343, reprinted in Brief for the Petitioner, Jury
Instructions 2005 WL 47401 3 at * 212 [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings]. See also
infra note 125 and accompanying text.
62 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.

''
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1. The Government's Case
The government's case featured David Duncan as its star witness.63
Prosecutors believed that Duncan's guilty plea and subsequent
admissions demonstrated the firm's intent to thwart the SEC
investigation and thereby obstruct justice.64 Duncan's behavior
following the Enron revelations, as well as the behavior of other partners
at the firm, showed knowing and corrupt persuasion. It also showed that
the firm's intent to obstruct justice began much earlier than the
document destruction order.65
In their opening statement, prosecutors described how a group of
partners at Andersen decided to shred documents when they realized an
SEC inquiry was inevitable. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Matt
Friedrich, "There was a day when a . . . small group of partners at Arthur
Andersen knew that the law was going to come knocking at their door,
asking a lot of questions about their firm. They made a choice to do
what they could while they thought that nobody was looking." Andersen
"knew the SEC was coming," he continued, "Nancy Temple wrote it
down."66
The government's case focused on Duncan but devoted significant
time to Temple as well. Duncan's corrupt persuasion consisted of
instructing his staff to destroy thousands of Enron-related documents to
keep them from in~esti~ators.~'
Prosecutors suggested that Temple's
emails had also corruptly persuaded Andersen employees to shred.68
63

David Ivanovich and Mary Flood, Andersen Faces Fire In Court This Week:
CHRON.,May 6, 2002, available at
Conviction Could Spell End of Firm, HOUSTON
http:/lwww.chron.com/cs/CDA/printsto~l398224.
64
Kurt Eichenwald, Early Inquiry Fear Seen at Andersen, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 22,2002, at
Al.
65 Id. Eichenwald describes the prosecution's "collective knowledge" argument: "In
essence, the actions of a wide array of Andersen officials can be used to argue that the
firm, as a whole, was anticipating an inquiry and had a criminal intent when the
shredding began."
See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron 's Many Strands: The Trial; Judge Says Andersen S Past
Can Be Evidence, N.Y. TIMES,May 8, 2002, at C6. Transcript of Proceedings at *51,
United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2002 Extra LEXIS 454 (S.D. TX May 8, 2002)
(No. CR.A. H-02-0121) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
67
See Tom Fowler, Duncan Sentencing Delayed and Given to Another Judge, HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Aug. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.chron.com/lcs/cda/ssistory.mpl/specIaandersed15
18581 (last visited Aug.
9, 2005).
68
See Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *2 1.
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They pointed as well to a videotape of Michael Odum from October 10,
2001-two days prior to his receipt of Temple's ernail to Duncangiving instructions to firm employees about destroying documents and
noting that (hypothetically speaking) it would be "great" if records were
shredded up to the day the firm learned of a lawsuit.69
Another damning fact lay in Andersen's billing records. They
showed the fm billing Enron for over $700,000 during the period of
October through November 2001, for time spent dealing with the SEC
investigation of ~ n r o n . ~The
'
records indicated that multiple Andersen
partners knew of the inquiry at the same time Andersen personnel were
destroying relevant document^.^' Thus, prosecutors asserted, the jury
could plausibly find either that Duncan, Temple or Odum formed the
"cormpt persuader" behind the firm's obstruction of justice.

2. Andersen 's Defense
By contrast, Andersen maintained that the government's case
collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions. As Rusty
Hardin, Andersen's lead trial attorney argued, "This is a documentdestruction charge by the government based on evidence and documents
that we [Andersen] preserved and gave them. Is there some irony in
that?"72 He compared the government's case to the children's book,
Where's Waldo, recommending that the jurors continually ask
themselves, "Who are the corrupt persuaders.?"73
In the defense's view, the much ballyhooed emails and memos from
Nancy Temple were little more than standard legal advice on document
retention for audit clients. Several Andersen partners testified that they
did not view Temple's email about the firm's document retention policy
, ' ~ later echoed by some
as anything other than prudent l a ~ ~ e r i na~view

See Eichenwald, supra note 64. Specifically, Odum stated that, ""if [documents are]
destroyed in the course of normal policy and litigation is filed the next day, that's great ...
we've followed our own policy and whatever there was that might have been of interest
to somebody is gone and irretrievable." United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP 374 F.3d
281 (5th Cir. 2004).
70 Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 701.
71 Id.
72 Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *68.
73 See id. at *78.
74 See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Andersen Partner Says He Knew Data Would Be Destroyed.
N . Y . TIMES,May 14,2002, at C4.
69
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in the legal co~nmunity.~~
Andersen gave even less credence to the
argument that Michael Odum's narrative on the training video amounted
to criminal behavior. Hardin told the jury to start by asking themselves
"if he is on this videotape telling people to do something wrong, why is
he doing it on a videotape.7,376
Duncan's testimony emerged as surprisingly problematic as well.
The government contended that his actions and subsequent guilty plea
demonstrated the company's guilt. However, Andersen used Duncan's
own testimony to undermine the notion that he had acted with the
requisite criminal intent. Unfamiliar with the firm's document retention
policy and ignorant of the legalities relating to document destruction,
Duncan admitted that he did not know at the time that he was acting
illegally. He testified that at the time he ordered the documents
shredded he did not believe he was committing a crime. He had thought
it legal to destroy documents until the firm actually received a subpoena
from the SEC.'~
Furthermore, when Duncan directed subordinates to destroy
documents, he instructed them to follow the firm's document retention
policy. The policy required the destruction of all records that were not
necessary to explain the accounting decisions reflected in the primary
work papers.78 Duncan told them to go no further than the policy
allowed. He also acknowledged directing the Enron engagement team to
75 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N . Y . TIMES, June 18,
2002, at A23. Commentators differ as to whether Temple's email was appropriate,
although many agree that it was "skating very close to the line." Tom Fowler, Lawyers
Fear Legal Impact of Andersen, HOUSTONCHRON.,June 25, 2002, available at
httD:Nwww.chron.co~cs/CDNssisto~.mvl/s~ecial/andersed1468838
(last visited Aug.
9,2005).
76 See Eichenwald, supra note 64; Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *84.
77
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Auditors Knew About Federal Inquiry, Records at Trial
Show, N . Y . TIMES,May 15, 2002 at C10. Duncan was mistaken as to the policy's
requirements. The policy specifically states that "[iln the event. . . AA . . . is advised of
litigation or subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related information should
not be destroyed." Andersen Policy Statement, entitled Practice Administration: Client
Engagement Information - Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760,
( last
Feb. 2000, Section 4.5.4, available at h~://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enon
visited Aug. 1, 2005). The policy goes on to state that "[rleasons for extended retention
might include regulatory agency investigations (e.g. by the SEC), pending tax cases, or
other legal action in connection with which the files would be necessary or useful. In
such cases, material in the files cannot be altered or deleted." Id. at 4.7.1.
78 See Andersen Policy Statement, Practice Administration: Client Engagement
Information - Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760, Section
2.0(4) (Feb. 2000). available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enron.
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retain copies of a draft memorandum that laid out the evolution of
Enron's accounting problems.79
According to Duncan, Temple directed that both the incorrect and
the corrected version of the memorandum regarding Enron's press
release be retained in the files:80 Duncan also testified that he
deliberately retained documents discussing Sherron Watkins'
allegations. These documents included potentially damaging statements
about Enron and its relationship with ~ n d e r s e n . ~Such
'
actions seem
uncharacteristic of a firm seeking to cover-up wrongdoing and to erase
its paper trail.
In general, Duncan's testimony proved less helpful to the
government's case than prosecutors had hoped.82 He appeared to admit
that he lacked the requisite intent for the crime to which he had pled
guilty. Given this apparent absence of intent, portraying Duncan as the
"corrupt persuader" that the statute requires became increasingly
difficult. If Duncan did not have the mens rea for the crime, then it
could not be imputed to the firm through him. This placed the
government's case in considerable peril.
Nevertheless, Duncan's testimony was not an unalloyed positive for
the defense. Both sides found themselves in uncomfortable positions.
Andersen had to argue that, irrespective of his guilty plea, Duncan had
not committed any crime. For its part, the prosecution found itself
reassuring the jury that, despite new evidence to the contrary, their star
witness was in fact a criminal.83

''

Kurt Eichenwald, Trial Judge and Lawyer for Andersen Tangle in Houston
May 17,2002, at C7.
Courtroom Shouting Match, N . Y . T~MES,
Id.
g' Id.
82 See Tom Fowler, Duncan Testimony Pleases Defense, HOUSTON
CHRON.,May 19,
2002, available at h t t p : N w w w . c h r o n . c o r n l c s / C D A / s s i s t o r y . m p ~ 1 4 1 6 6 4 4 .
83 See Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 701.
-~~
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3. The Jury Instructions
After both sides rested, Judge Harmon instructed the jury that to
convict under 18 U.S.C. 5 1512(b)(2), it must unanimously find that
Andersen, through an agent or employee:
acted knowingly with corrupt intent
to cause or persuade one of Andersen's employees
to withhold a document from an official proceeding,
or alter, destroy or conceal an object
with intent to impair its availability in an official proceeding84
84

See Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *7-33. The instructions read in relevant part:
In order to prove Andersen's guilt . . . the Government must prove each of the
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that . . . the Andersen firm through its agents corruptly persuaded or
attempted to corruptly persuade another person or persons; and second, that
Andersen through its agents acted knowingly or with intent to cause or induce
another person or persons to, A, withhold a record or document from an
official proceeding or, B, alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object's availability for use in an official proceeding.
The word, quote, corruptly, close quote, means having an improper purpose.
An improper purpose for this case is an intent to subvert, undermine, or
impede the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding.
Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an agent, such as a partner, of
Andersen acting within the scope of his or her employment induced or
attempted to induce another employee or partner of the firm or some other
person to withhold, alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object and that the
agent did so with the intent, at least in part, to subvert, undermine, or impede
the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding, then you may find that
Andersen committed the first element of the charged offense.
The second element of the charged offense . . . is that Andersen, through its
agents, acted knowingly and with the intent to cause or induce another person
to withhold a record or a document from an official proceeding or to alter,
destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.
An act is done with the intent to impair the integrity or availability of a
document or object only if it is undertaken with the specific purpose of making
the document or object unavailable for use in an official proceeding.
However, the Government is not required to prove that Andersen's sole or even
primary intent was to cause another person to make a document or object
unavailable for use in an official proceeding. You may find that this intent
element has been established if you conclude that Andersen acted, at least in
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The judge explained that the prosecution did not need to prove that
the illicit acts of Andersen agents or employees were approved by the
partnership or accorded with its policies. A partnership is responsible
for actions taken by agents within the scope of their employment
regardless of whether the agent acted contrary to instructions and/or
against company
After seven days of deliberation, the jury reported that it was
deadlocked. The judge gave an Allen chargeg6and instructed jurors to
continue deliberating. Shortly thereafter, the jury sent out Note #9,
which asked:
If each of us believes that one Andersen agent acted
knowingly and with corrupt intent, is it [necessary] for
all of us to believe it was the same agent.

Can one believe it was agent A, another believe it was
agent B, and another believe it agent c . * ~
part, with the intent to cause another person to make a document or object
unavailable for use in an official proceeding.

...
[I]t is not necessary for the Government to prove that Andersen knew that its
conduct violated the criminal law. Thus, even if Andersen honestly and
sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you may find Andersen guilty if
you conclude that Andersen acted corruptly and with the intent to make
documents unavailable for an official proceeding.
Moreover, the Government is not required to prove that Andersen was
successful or likely to succeed in subverting, undermining, or impeding the
fact-finding ability of an official proceeding. Nor is the Government required
to prove that Andersen was successful or likely to succeed in making
documents unavailable for that proceeding. It is Andersen's purpose and intent,
not the success of its effort that the Govenunent must prove as elements of the
charged offense.
Id. at *24-29.
See id.
"See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). An "Allen" charge urges jurors
to put aside their differences and come to a verdict. Also known as a "dynamite charge,"
the instruction aims to overcome or "explode" the reservations of holdout jurors. See
Stephen Landsman, Death of An Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen of
L. REV. 1203, 1218 (2003).
Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT
87
Jonathan Weil et a]., Dramatic Question From Jury Could Shape Andersen's Fate,
WALLST. J., June 14, 2002, at A l .
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This query presented an issue of first impression for the court. In
fact, as subsequently became clear, no court anywhere had ever
addressed a question even similar to it.
Unsurprisingly, the two sides took opposite positions. Following
preliminary arguments, the parties briefed the issue and then argued it
again the next day. Andersen argued that the jurors must unanimously
agree on the actorlagent of the corporation who committed the crime
while the government maintained that the law did not require jury
unanimity on this point.
Judge Harmon ruled in favor of the prosecution. She informed the
jury that "[tlo find Andersen guilty as charged you must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one agent of Andersen acted with the
required knowledge and intent, but you need not all agree unanimously
that it was the same agent of Andersen who acted with the required
knowledge and intent."88
Eventually, the jury broke its deadlock and returned a verdict of
guilty. It did not have to rely on the court's answer to Note # 9 because
it managed to reach consensus on the identity of the responsible
Andersen agent. According to post-verdict interviews, the jury
concluded that Nancy Temple's email to Duncan suggesting the deletion
of "some language that might suggest we have concluded the [Enron
press] release is misleading" showed that she was the "corrupt
persuader."89 The news of the jury's theory of guilt shocked virtually
everyone involved with the case because neither side had focused on that
email during the trial.90
111. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE RULING ON NOTE #9
While I believe the Supreme Court correctly overturned the
verdict:' the jury's decision is not my focus here. The Court reversed
See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 59 at *6343.
Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 704. See also Mary Flood, Decision By
Jurors Hinged on Memo, HOUSTONCHRON., June 19, 2002, avaialbe at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpWspeciaWmdersedl456547.
90 See Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Jury Finds Andersen Guilty, Says Shredding Meant
HOUSTON CHRON., June
15,
2002,
Nothing,
available
at
http:Nwww.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/speciaWemodl455557.
91 See supra note 2 .
88
89
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because the jury had been improperly instructed regarding the nature of
the required mens re^.'^ As a result, it did not have to conclude that the
guilty agent knew she was acting wrongfully.93 This article focuses on a
related but distinct issue-the trial judge's ruling on Jury Note # 9.
Judge Harmon decreed that the jury did not need to agree on who at
Andersen possessed the culpable mens rea or on who acted upon it.
Though mooted for purposes of the trial, the ruling remains important as
the sole judicial pronouncement within an unsettled area of law.
A finding that juries need not unanimously agree on the identity of
the bad actor within a corporation gives wide latitude to prosecutors.
Under this rationale, prosecutors can present multiple theories involving
any number of potential bad actors. All they need to do is convince the
jury that someone did something rather than that a particular person did
a particular thing.
Allowing jurors this leeway violates the foundational principle of
federal law that juries must unanimously convict in criminal trials.94 It
also allows prosecutors to offer multiple theories of guilt, not in the
hopes that the jury will settle on one, but rather than it will settle on
some of them. This scattershot jurisprudence will markedly shift the
dynamics of criminal trials and will almost certainly spur challenges by
the defense bar.95
The ruling erred on a more subtle, rhetorical level as well. By
validating the government's position, the court adopted a stance that
strips agents of agency while attributing consciousness to a legal

92

See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct 2129, 2131-32 (2005) ("We
hold that the jury instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a 'comp[t]
persuas[ion]' conviction under 8 1512(b) and therefore reverse.") (alteration in original).
93 See id. at 2136 ("The instructions . . . diluted the meaning of 'corruptly' so that it
covered innocent conduct.").
94
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95 See David M . Zornow & Christopher J. Gunther, After Andersen, Can Companies Get
a Meaningful Jury Trial? N.Y. L.J.,Jul. 8,2002, at 9.
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fiction.96 Understanding the full dimensions of the error and its
implications requires a close analysis of the issues raised by Note # 9.
Recall that the question the jury presented to the judge involved
whether it could convict Andersen if all the jurors agreed that someone
at the entity had acted knowingly and with corrupt intent but could not
agree as to exactly who. They wished to know whether it was
permissible for some of them to believe that the wrongdoer was Agent
A, others to believe it was Agent B, and so forth.97

I . Andersen: Unanimity Is Required
Andersen argued that the jury must unanimously agree on the actor
who committed the crime. Otherwise, the jury could not possibly agree
on intent, a crucial element of the crime.98 The entity can be found to
have a particular state of mind only if one of its partners or employees
had that state of mind.99 Intent cannot be disaggregated among multiple
actors.
Corporations act through their agents. To commit a crime, those
agents must possess criminal intent. It follows that to convict, the jury
must agree on the identity of the agent who intended to commit the
crime. "[Tlhe jury can find that Andersen had a particular intent only if
the jurors unanimously find that a particular person at the firm had that
state of mind. Absent that finding, the jury simply cannot conclude that

AS Chief Justice Marshall observed in United States v. Deveauw, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,
86 (1 809), a corporation is "certainly not a citizen," it is rather an "invisible, intangible,
and artificial being . . . [a] mere legal entity." Marshall reasoned that corporations could
not, therefore, invoke diversity jurisdiction. Less than fifty years later, in Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1853), the Court
reconsidered, holding that corporations may invoke diversity jurisdiction despite the fact
that they are "invisible" and "intangible" on the basis that their stockholders are
presumed to hold citizenship in the state of incorporation. One commentator observes
that this decision effectively meant that "corporations gained entry into the federal
judicial system as participants equal in standing to individuals" in civil disputes.
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 833, 835 (2000). Fifty years later, the Court ushered in what Friedman described
as "the modem era of corporate criminal liability." Id.
97 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98
Brief of Andersen at 1, United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. CP.A. H-02-0212 (S.D.
TX. June 14,2002).
99 Id. at 2.
96
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Andersen, as an entity, had any state of mind at
required mens rea, there can be no guilty verdict.

[Vol. 13:2

And, without the

2. Prosecution: Identity is Not an Element and Unanimity is
Not Required
The government sought to cast the issue solely as one of identity,
which it argued was not an element of the crime and therefore did not
require jury unanimity. In its view, "the identity of a specific corporate
actor is not an element of the offense, but rather a method and means by
which a corporation can be found guilty of a crime."lo1 To find
otherwise would hamstring corporate criminal prosecutions and shield
corporations from liability.Io2
According to this view, corporate actors are merely the method and
means through which the entity commits crimes.103 The act and intent
lie within the corporation itself. Agents are tools, nothing more. As the
prosecution argued, the Andersen agents were analogous to guns used in
a robbery: "All [the jury has] to agree on is that a gun was used, not the
same gun . . . . Just think of (Andersen partners) as guns."104Similarly,
the jury did not have to agree which Andersen agent obstructed justice,
just that the firm itself committed the crime.

C. THEJUDGESIDESWITHTHE PROSECUTION:
IDENTITYAS
MEANS
The judge's ruling in favor of the government implicitly accepted
the premise that the identity of the corrupt persuader forms a means
rather than an element of the crime of obstruction of justice. By this
reasoning, the elements of the crime as enumerated in the statute include
mens rea ("knowingly . . . corruptly") and actus reus (persuading
another person to "alter destroy mutilate, or conceal an object with intent
to impair . . . an official proceeding . . .").Io5 Identity is not explicitly set
forth in the statute and therefore forms a mere means of the crime's
commission. Since it is settled law that unanimity is not required when

Id. at 3.
Brief of Gov't at 5, United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. CP.A. H-02-0212 (S.D.
TX. June 14,2002).
'02 See generally, id. at 4.
Io3 Id. at 5 .
Io4 Greg Farrell, Andersen J u r y May Be Leaning Toward Guilty, USA TODAY,June 13,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/energy/enrod2002-06-13-andersenjury-deliberations.htm.
Io5 18 U.S.C. $$ 1512(b) (2002).
loo
lo'
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determining the means of a crime,Io6the jury need not reach consensus
regarding the identity of the guilty agent.
By way of illustration, consider a case where the defendant allegedly
used the threat of force to carry out a robbery (threat of force comprising
an element of the crime of robbery). The jury need not unanimously
agree on the nature of the threat."' Some jurors might believe that the
defendant used a knife while others might think he used a gun. The law
does not require consensus on the manner or means in which the
defendant satisfied the element; it requires only that all agree that the
element itself-using the threat of force-be satisfied.Io8
In the instant case, Arthur Andersen, LLP - not individual agents
of the firm-was standing trial. Consequently, the jury needed to
unanimously find that the firm had the requisite mens rea. It did not
need to unanimously agree on how the firm came by that mens rea and
in whom it resided. If some jurors felt that one agent possessed criminal
intent and other jurors believed the intent lay with another, that
difference of opinion was immaterial for purposes of c o n v i ~ t i o n . ' ~ ~

D. IDENTITYIS NOTANELEMENT
BUTIT IS ALSONOT THE ISSUE
1. Identity Can Be Crucial to Determining the Intent and the Act

While the prosecution's reasoning has a surface allure, it does not
withstand close scrutiny. According to the prosecution's logic, the issue
reads as follows:
The jury is uncertain as to the identity of the corrupt persuader
within Andersen;
Identity is not an element of 18 U.S.C. $ 1512;
Therefore the jury need not agree on the identity of the corrupt
persuader within Andersen.

106

See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("We have
never suggested that in returning general verdicts . . . the jurors should be required to
agree upon a single means of commission , any more than the indictments were required
to specify one alone.")
107
See id.; McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
concuning).
lo' See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 81 7 (1999).
Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 2.
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The flaw in this reasoning lies with the conflation of means and
mens rea. Contending that the question hinges on whether identity is a
means or an element of the statute steers the court into an area of
unsettled law--distinguishing between means and elements"0-rather
than toward the uncontroversial and long-settled principle that jury
unanimity is required on the issue of mens rea itself."' In addition, even
assuming identity is not an element of the crime, the court still erred in
its ruling.
Assume, arguendo, that identity is a means rather than an element
of the crime. There is some basis for such an assumption in the
corporate context.Il2 In large corporations, one can hide one's doings
beneath layers of bureaucratic camouflage, sometimes rendering it
impossible to identify culpable individuals definitively. If identity were
a nonnegotiable prerequisite for prosecution, it would severely hamper
efforts to rein in corporate crime."3 Instead, it would seem sensible to
permit convictions of the corporate entity while allowing the identity of
the guilty agent[s] to remain o b ~ c u r e . " ~
Consider the following fictional example:

A memo from the Legal Department of Beelzebub, Inc.
dated January 9, 2005 orders the shredding of all records
relating to the last three quarterly earnings statements. A
day after the accounting department complies, the SEC
subpoenas the now destroyed records as part of an
ongoing fraud investigation. Based on these facts, it
appears that one or more people at Beelzebub violated
18 U.S.C. 5 1512 (b)(2) by corruptly persuading other
employees to destroy evidence.Il5 However, it is not
"O See Schad, 501 U.S. at 634-35 (citing cases "deriving primarily from" United States
v. Gipson, 553 F2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
111
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)
("[Elxistence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. Intent generally remains an indispensable
element of a criminal offense.") (internal citation omitted); but see Schad, 501 U.S. at
639-40 (holding that a jury need not unanimously agree whether a defendant is guilty of
IS' degree murder under premeditated murder or felony murder, which have different
mens reas, so long as all jurors believe one of the two.)
' I 2 Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 5-7.
' I 3 see id. at 5.
"4 See id.
Under the revised statute, the actions would violate 18 U.S.C. 5 1512 (c) (2002) as
well since the agent corruptly obstructed an official proceeding.

"'
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clear precisely who did it.
Beelzebub's Legal
Department has over 700 members. Even assuming the
offender actually belonged to that department, locating
him or her remains nearly impossible.
Though diligent investigation fails to conclusively
identify the responsible parties, the government indicts
anyway and the case goes to trial. The defense moves
for a directed verdict, arguing that the jury could not
reasonably convict because it cannot identify the bad
actor within the corporation. The judge denies the
motion and the case goes to the jury. Can the jury
convict on these facts?
Yes, it likely could. Because Beelzebub, Inc. is on trial and not an
individual, a jury could reasonably conclude that an agent of Beelzebub
obstructed justice while never knowing the actual identity of the
agent.'16 Knowing the agent's name is not necessary to believing that
s h e was an agent of the corporation who knowingly and corruptly
persuaded other employees to tamper with evidence. Convicting
Beelzebub on this basis would not sound any of the procedural alarms
raised by Jury Note # 9. Understanding why this is so requires that we
recognize the distinctions between the Beelzebub example and the
Andersen case.

2. There Was No Unanimity Regarding Either the Mens Rea or
Actus Reus
In the above example, the jury unanimously concluded that a
particular unnamed agent (who we'll call "Lucifer") at Beelzebub did a
particular thing (sent a memo directing that relevant documents be
destroyed) at a particular time (January 9, 2005). The jury further
While no case law speaks definitively to this issue, there are cases suggesting that
knowledge of the culpable agent's identity is not a prerequisite to a corporation's
conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 4 11 (7th Cir.
1941) (detailing how a corporation was convicted of conspiracy though all defendant
officers and agents were acquitted; court concluded that unnamed co-conspirators could
have been responsible for the company's actions); President Coolidge (Dollar S.S. Co.)
v. United States, 101 F2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (involving steamship company convicted
of discharging waste-a strict liability offense-though responsible crewmember was
not known); see also Stacey Neumann Vu, Note: Corporate Criminal Liability:
Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM.L. REV.
459, 472-73 (2004) (discussing related phenomenon of inconsistent verdicts where
agents are acquitted and corporation is nevertheless convicted).
'I6
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concluded that Lucifer knew an investigation was imminent and
intended to corruptly persuade other employees to tamper with evidence.
All of the elements of the crime are therefore satisfied. The jury
unanimously agreed on the nature of the bad act and the intent of the
actor. Though the specific identity of the actorlagent remains unknown,
the jury is satisfied that she exists and that her actions and intent violated
the law.
Contrast the Beelzebub scenario with the Andersen case. In
Andersen, the prosecution presented competing theories of the actus
reus of corrupt persuasion. It suggested that it could have been
Duncan's directing subordinates to shred, Temple's emails regarding the
document retention policy or the wording of a memo, or Odum's video
presentation encouraging the destruction of audit workpapers up to the
day the firm learns of a lawsuit.
These actions were carried out by different people on different days.
For any of them to be criminal, the responsible individual must have had
guilty intent."' The act of knowing corrupt persuasion is inseparable
from the intent to do so. One cannot innocently yet cormptly
persuade11gnor can the intent to corruptly persuade reside with someone
other than the persuader.
If six jurors believed Nancy Temple corruptly persuaded, then those
same jurors by definition must have believed that she intended to
corruptly persuade as well. If six other jurors believed that David
Duncan was the corrupt persuader, then those jurors similarly believed
that Duncan intended to corruptly persuade. If six believed that Temple
did it and six that Duncan did it, then they jury lacked consensus as to

117

For purposes of 18 U.S.C. $ 1512 (2002), the requisite guilty intent is knowledge.
The Supreme Court faulted the judge's failure to adequately explain that knowing
corrupt persuasion necessarily involves knowing of the wrongfulness of the act. See
Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct 2129, 2 136 (2005) ("Only persons
conscious of wrongdoing can be said to 'knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e]."') (citing
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995)). I am making a different point. I
submit that regardless of one's knowledge of the legality of the act, it is self-evident that
one cannot knowingly corruptly persuade without knowing one is doing so.
lL8
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the existence of a corrupt persuader.
impermissible. l 9

21 1

Conviction was therefore

If the jury were to conclude (as it ultimately did) that Temple
corruptly persuaded other employees to obstruct justice, then the jury
also had to believe that she intended to do so. The same would hold true
for Duncan or Odurn. It follows that when the jury deadlocked, the
disagreement involved more than just the identity of the corrupt
persuader. The deadlock arose because some jurors believed that Person
X committed Crime A and some believed that Person Y committed
Crime B. This amounts to a disagreement not just over identity but over
the nature of the crime itself.
By way of further illustration, consider the following two analogous
hypotheticals.
Jane Smith is standing trial for armed robbery.
Prosecutors offer two different scenarios for her guilt: 1)
that she robbed a convenience store on July 4 and, 2)
that she robbed a bank on July 14.'~' When the case
goes to the jury, half of the jury believes that she robbed
the convenience store but not the bank while the other
half believe that she robbed the bank but not the
convenience store. Though all the jurors agree that she
committed armed robbery, they do not agree as to when,
where or how. Under these circumstances, it would be
manifestly unconstitutional to convict her because the
jury has not unanimously concluded that she committed
any crime. All the jurors feel she is guilty of something,
but they disagree as to what.12'

'I9 Those jurors who subscribed to one theory of guilt (i.e., that Temple did it) must not
have believed that anyone else was also guilty. If, for example, the jurors who thought
that Temple obstructed justice thought that Duncan obstructed justice as well, and the six
other jurors thought that Duncan and no one else obstructed justice, then there would
have been unanimity on the issue of Duncan's guilt. That would have obviated any
deadlock.
I2O Though usehl as an illustration, this scenario could not actually take place.
Indictments must clearly specify the nature of the crime alleged. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
7(c)(l).
12'
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 450 (1990) ("Th[e] rule does not
require that each bit of evidence be unanimously credited or entirely discarded, but it
does require unanimous agreement as to the nature of the defendant's violation, not
simply the fact that a violation has occurred.").
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Now change the defendant from Jane Smith to Beelzebub, Inc.
Beelzebub faces trial for dumping hazardous waste into
waterways in violation of the Clean Water Act.IZ2 The
prosecution presents evidence that Mephisto,
Beelzebub's senior vice president, dumped dry cleaning
solvent into the Hudson River in 2004. The prosecution
also argues that Sammael, Beelzebub's CFO, dumped
biowaste into the Gulf of Mexico in 2003, also in
violation of the Clean Water
When the case goes
to the jury, half of the jurors believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mephisto dumped into the Hudson. The other
half is dubious about Mephisto but fervently believes
that Sarnrnael dumped into the Gulf. Even though
everyone on the jury believes that someone at Beelzebub
did something illegal, they disagree about what actually
happened.
Here again, the jury should not convict for either crime. There is no
agreement as to the act, actor, or intent. The jury does not agree on
anything other than that at some time in the past, someone committed a
crime of some sort and that that person worked at Beelzebub, Inc. That
is a flimsy hook on which to hang a conviction.
Yet, in United States v. Andersen, the judge allowed the jury to hang
its verdict on this very hook. The jury did not agree on the actor
(Temple, Duncan or Odum), or the action (directing subordinates to
shred, sending an email suggesting shredding, or making a videotape
encouraging employees to destroy evidence). It follows that the jury
similarly lacked consensus on the presence of intent. If it could not
agree on the nature of the crime or the person who committed it, the jury
could not possibly have agreed on whether whoever committed the
crime intended to do so.
To convict amidst all this uncertainty would be manifestly wrong. A
shared belief that someone did something illegal is not the same as a

I2'See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. $$ 13 19 (c)(l)-(2).
lZ3 See id.
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shared belief that a particular person committed a particular crime. Only
the latter enables c o n ~ i c t i o n . ' ~ ~
The government's case founders on other bases as well. In arguing
that the jury could convict without knowing the identity of the corrupt
persuader, prosecutors maintained that the identity of the guilty
corporate agent was immaterial. The agent formed merely the method
and means through which the entity, Andersen, committed the crime.'25
The actual person or people who perpetrated the act were comparable to
the weapon(s) used in a robbery; they were mere tools acting at the
behest and under the control of the entity.'26
This position directly contradicts the jury instructions, which
required the jury to determine which agent at Andersen acted knowingly
with corrupt intent to cause or persuade another employee to alter or
destroy evidence.'27 Maintaining that the agent is fungible and that her
identity is irrelevant to the entity's guilt negates the requirement that the
jury decide who within the company acted as the corrupt persuader. On
that basis alone, the government's argument should have failed.
The government's position is also inconsistent as a matter of
statutory exegesis and common sense. One cannot logically contend that
agents of a corporation have no intent while simultaneously maintaining
that those same agents were knowing corrupt persuaders. The two
propositions are mutually exclusive.
On the one hand, prosecutors contended that the guilty agent at
Andersen knowingly and corruptly persuaded other employees to
obstruct justice. On the other hand, prosecutors argued that agents at
Andersen either have no mens rea of their own or that their mens rea is
immaterial because they are mere pawns of the entity. According to the
latter thesis, the guilty intent resides with the corporation and the identity
of the agentlactor is therefore irrelevant.

124 AS Justice Scalia observes in his concurrence in Schad, "We would not permit. . . an
indictment charging that defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday,
despite the "moral equivalence" of the two acts." 501 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
125 See Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 5.
Iz6 See id. at 6.
12' Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 59, at *212.
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These two positions cannot coexist. Either the agent had the intent
to corruptly persuade and did corruptly persuade or she did not. If the
former, then under these facts, the jury must agree as to the agent's
identity. If the latter, then, per the judge's instructions, the jury must
acquit.'28
Not only does the prosecution's argument strip the people making
up the corporation of any will or intent of their own, it transposes that
will or intention on to the corporate entity-a legal fiction created by the
law as a matter of social ~0nvenience.l~~
To attribute intent to such a
creation is to bring an incorporeal entity to life, a feat surpassing even
that of Dr. Frankenstein. Frankenstein at least worked with a body that
was once alive.I3O The government, on the other hand, wished to enliven
something that never actually existed outside the printed page.

'''

See id.; see also Darling, supra note 4, at 165 1 ("Because knowing conduct and intent
are an essential element [sic] of obstruction of justice, and because entity intent can be
established only by reference to the intent of one or more agents, direct imputation of
intent makes the identity of the corrupt persuader an essential element and disagreement
on this element should be fatal to the government's case."). Darling goes on to argue
that entities themselves can serve as corrupt persuaders. See id. at 1651-54. This
position seems to impart overmuch agency to incorporeal entities. Even accepting the
phenomenon of corporate intent as distinct from that of individual agents, the idea of
distinct corporate actions remains problematic.
A multiplicity of views exists as to the nature and origin of corporate "personhood,"
which attribute varying degrees of agency to the entity. The "Reality Theory,"
propounded by Otto von Gierke, argues that the law cannot create its subjects but rather
can only recognize preexisting societal facts which meet its requirements. By this
reasoning, recognizing corporate personhood involves the law simply acknowledging the
existence of societal facts that create the corporate phenomenon and they meet the
criteria for juristic personhood.
Gierke's theory, though intriguing, begs the question of the nature of corporate
personhood; it avers that since the law can't create persons, it couldn't have created
corporate personhood. Furthermore, if we accept the common conception of a juristic
person (that is to say, a person for purposes of the law) as something that is the subject of
a right, legal personhood bears little relation to intentionality. The dispositive issue for
purposes of agency lies in whether one "administers" those rights to which one is
supra
subject. This poses a question that is less legal than sociological. See FRENCH,
note 56, at 38. The above discussion relies heavily on French's much fuller and highly
lucid analysis of the issue. See id. at 34-38.; see also Friedman, supra note 94, at 846
("While a corporation's possession o f . . . rights suggests a separate identity . . . . that
identity may represent nothing other than the sum of the rights the organization
ossesses in aid of its business and enjoys at the sufferance of the legislature.")
See MARYSHELLEY,
FRANKENSTEM
(Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley eds., London
1831)

"
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Furthermore, maintaining that the firm's agents were merely tools in
the nefarious grip of a malevolent corporate entity expands the notion of
corporate criminal liability to an unprecedented and unsustainable
extreme. The bankruptcy of this reasoning becomes clear if we apply it
to the crime of homicide. If a corporate employee kills someone on the
orders of his employer, one can scarcely imagine a prosecutor arguing
that the employee bears no responsibility, that she was merely an
extension of the gun, and that the corporation pulled the trigger. Yet, the
government made almost precisely this argument in the Andersen trial,
explicitly comparing corrupt persuaders within the firm to guns.'31
The roots of this novel legal approach lie within the collective
knowledge doctrine, wherein corporate criminal intent is aggregated
from a group of agents.'32 No one person at the entity intends to commit
the entire criminal act. Instead, each actor intends to do a portion of the
act and collectively, they intend to commit the crime even if they are not
aware of each other.'33 Since corporate intent aggregates agents'
intentions, the entity acquires an intention that does not exist at any
individual level-a
form of mental gestalt.
However, even if the
Andersen jury had been permitted to consider collective knowledge as a
theory of guilt-which it was not-the prosecution's position barely
resembles a typical collective knowledge premise.
No one contended that the aggregated intents of Duncan, Odum, and
Temple amounted to a "knowing" mens rea. Rather, the prosecution
claimed that it did not matter what Duncan, Odum, or Temple might
have intended because they were mere tools. By extension, it also did
not matter that they committed entirely different acts. Subscribing to
this logic strips all agency from agents. It relocates that agency in a

131
132

See Brief of Gov't supra note 99, at 6.

See FRENCH,
supra note 56.
See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F3d 908,
918 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding the collective knowledge doctrine "allow[s] a plaintiff to
prove scienter by piecing together scraps of "innocent" knowledge held by various
corporate officials, even if those officials never had contact with each other or knew
what others were doing. . .")
133
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liminal space wherein corporations gain intelligence, intention, and the
power to act separate and apart from their agents.'34
By the government's lights, Arthur Andersen, LLP - rather than any
person at the fm - intended to (and did) corruptly persuade an
employee to obstruct justice. As is now clear, this premise is incoherent
for purposes of corporate criminal prosecution. However, there are
circumstances where attributing a singular will to a collective is
appropriate. The practice has roots in longstanding principles of
international law, particularly the laws of war.
The fact that prosecutors successfully injected this international
vision of entity guilt into a domestic case is cause for alarm.
International laws of war do not safeguard civil liberties in the ways that
our Constitution requires.
Adjudicating a peacetime criminal
prosecution in this manner bodes ill for due process. A fuller discussion
of the implications of this version of collective responsibility forms Part
IV of this article.
IV. ENTITY IDENTITY
Disembodied legal fictions possessing criminal intent separate and
apart from human agents is not as odd a concept as it might appear.13'
L34

Though theorists of corporate responsibility vary in the amount of intention they
ascribe to the corporate entity-French , for example, ascribes a great deal-I know of
none who maintain that agents of the corporation lack any agency whatever. See
FRENCH,supra note 56. That position is both unique to the Andersen prosecution and, I
believe, logically insupportable. For detailed discussions of the various theories of
corporate responsibility and their efficacy, see Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and
the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF.CRIM. L. REV. 641, 650-709 (2000); Annie
Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability, 39 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 327, 328-336 (2002);
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 109 HARV.L.
REV. 1477 (1996); see also Friedman,supra note 94, at 833-858.
135
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 94, at 847 ("The modem corporation has an
identifiable persona, to which we ascribe expressive conduct as a matter of course. [This
means] a presence in the community quite apart from that of its owners, manager and
employees."); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
L. REV. 1095, 1123 (1991) (arguing that a corporation's
Criminal Liability, 75 M~NN.
ethos, the "abstract and intangible, character of a corporation [that is] separate from the
substance of what it actually does," distinguishes it from its component members).
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The concept of a collective entity having its own discrete identity enjoys
wide acceptance in everyday speech and thought, both legal and
colloquial. Consider: "The 5th Circuit upheld the ruling," "Ford
discontinued the Thunderbird," or "the jury reached a verdict."136
The Philadelphia Orchestra changes members frequently but its
identity remains constant. Rock groups often continue to perform
though few if any original members remain with the band.13' In each
instance, membership in the collective shifts over time while the entity's
identity stays static.I3* Collectives' ability to retain their identity amidst
multiple personnel shifts amounts to an implicit cultural recognition of
their independent id en ti tie^.'^^

B. NATIONALIDENTITYAND THE BANALITY OF EVIL
Acknowledging the ability of a collective to acquire a social
identity distinct from the simple aggregation of its agents is a long way
from advocating for criminal conviction on that basis. In the past, entity
guilt of this sort has been confined to international law where nations,
not just their citizens, can be held responsible for crimes.140 For

'''

Fletcher offers this intriguing example related by Bernard Williams: "The Fifth Army
feinted toward the Rhine and then fell to looting and raping." The example contains
instances of a group acting both collectively and individually. The army as a whole
feinted toward the Rhine but individual soldiers committed the subsequent crimes. This
is a useful illustration that collective identity can exist without eliminating individual
AT WAR,supra note 5 at 71.
ca acity for intent and action. FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
"'For
example, the Rolling Stones changed guitarists twice and bassists once. Original
guitarist Brian Jones died in 1969 and was replaced by Mick Taylor, who left the band in
1974 and was replaced with Ron Wood. Bill Wyrnan, the bassist for almost three
decades, left the band in 1991. Similarly, The Who endured the death of drummer Keith
Moon in 1978 and the death of bassist John Entwhistle in 2002, but the band continues to
record and tour.
'38 Not every collective consists of fungible members. George Hanison famously
declared that there will be no Beatles reunion "as long as John Lemon remains dead."
See Nora Meany, They Can Work it Out, But Why?, THE SWON, (2000),
http://www.thesimon.com/magazine/articles/old~issues/0097~they~work~out~but~why.
html (last visited July 23,2005). Prior to his death, Lemon also opined on the collective
phenomenon that was the Beatles, observing that, "I'm not the Beatles. I'm me. Paul
isn't the Beatles. The Beatles are the Beatles. Separately, they are separate -I don't
believe in Beatles. I just believe in me." Id.
supra note 56.
See FRENCH,
14' See Steve Sheppard, Passion and Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and
the Collective, 78 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 751, 755-56 (2003) (noting that, the Charter of
the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice as well as
subsequent international military tribunals and the International Criminal Court sought to
"hold not only states accountable for war but also, effectively, the individuals whose
orders and actions are the means of a state's prosecution of the war.").
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example, some crimes like genocide are predicated on entity
responsibility.'41 However, there are crucial differences in the
circumstances of international criminal trials as opposed to the domestic
prosecution of corporations.
When nations and/or their citizens are tried by an international
tribunal, it is because the social and legal system of the offending nation
sanctioned behavior unacceptable to the international
The citizens who committed the wrongfbl acts acted with the imprimatur
of their legal system and might well have believed they were behaving
appropriately. This leads to the infamous "banality of evil" phenomenon
described by Hannah ~ r e n d t . ' ~ ~

I . The Eichmann Example
Banality of evil refers to the experience of morally repugnant
behavior becoming legally and culturally a c ~ e ~ t a b 1 e The
. l ~ ~reification
of this phenomenon is Adolf Eichrnann, an unexceptional man who,
following a mediocre scholastic career drifted into the SS and emerged
as one of the chief administrators of the Final ~ o l u t i o n . ' ~
His
~ antiSemitism was no more virulent than that of millions of his fellow
citizens, yet his actions enabled the murder of millions of Jews.
See FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5, at 69-70.
The notion of justice is, of course, subject to interpretation and can vary from nation
to nation. However, certain values are pan-national and have been codified in various
international conventions and treaties. See Sheppard, supra note 138, at 755-56. John
Rawls posits that the starting point for all laws inheres in certain foundational axioms
OF JUSTICE
upon which all people could theoretically agree. See JOHNRAWLS,A THEORY
3 1 (1999). These reflect an "overlapping consensus" which people with a diversity of
viewpoints can endorse because their values are incorporated within them. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
9-1 1, 58-66, 65 (1993). This overlapping consensus
arguably leads to the norms that form the basis for international law. See, e.g., MARTHA
NUSSBAUM,
HIDINGFROMHUMANITY:
DISGUST,
SHAMEAND THE LAW57 (2004) ("[Tlhe
tyranny of the majority over minority opinion is a major danger in political life, and . . .
one of the great strengths of the classical liberal tradition is its respect for spheres of
freedom within which individuals choose the goals that they think most important.").
Nussbaurn contrasts this view with that of Amitai Etzioni, whose cornmunitarian value
system privileges homogeneity as the unifying factor within society. In this
"monochrome society," citizens identify with what they have in common rather than
what renders them distinct. Nussbaum further notes that neither classical liberals nor
comrnunitarians would embrace a legal regime that chooses the norms society should
value. Id. at 56-57.
143 HANNAH
ARENDT,ECHIMANN
IN JERUSALEM:
A REPORTON THEBANALITYOF EVIL
287 (Penguin Classics 1994) (1963).
see id. at 135.
'45 Id.at 20-2 1.
14'

'41
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Eichmann viewed his behavior as law-abiding and therefore just. He felt
"free of all guilt," secure in the knowledge that his superiors knew and
approved of his actions.146He even believed that his actions harmonized
with the Kantian Categorical 1mperative.I4'
Ascribing a duty of blind obedience to the Categorical Imperative
completely misinterprets Kant's teachings.148 Kant perceived the
human condition as a struggle to transcend sensual impulses and to act
according to the dictates of pure reason. The laws of reason are
independent of and need not bear any resemblance to the constructed
laws of human ~ 0 c i e t y . l ~ ~
Eichmann's misinterpretation is relevant here because his belief that
the legality of his actions under German law relieved him of
responsibility for his behavior bears directly on the notion of collective
criminal intent. It is certainly possible to argue, as Eichmann did, that
Id at 114.
Arendt has little patience for Eichmam's reliance on Kantian reason, declaring it
"outrageous" to presume Kant would have approved of blind obedience. See ARENDT,
supra note 141, at 135.
'41
TO suggest that living in a nation of unjust laws absolves one of all moral
responsibility is to claim that one is morally bound to obey unjust laws, an ethically
bankrupt position. To borrow a phrase often attributed to Aquinas, "lex iniusta non est
lex" ("an unjust law is not a law"). Though he never said precisely these words, the
maxim does reflect Aquinas's thinking and, as a philosophical precept, has significant
practical value. See generally, Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on
Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS.99 (1988). Karl Jaspers argues
that we are accountable for the way we are governed, even if we live under a repressive
regime and that we are accountable for our actions, regardless of the duress involved, if
ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5, at 78-79.
the act could be avoided. See FLETCHER,
John Rawls also provides some useful insight, observing that political legitimacy (from
which would follow "legitimate law") requires a sincere belief that "the reasons we
would offer for our political actions-were we to state them as government officialsare sufficient, and [that] we also reasonably think that other citizens might also
WITH THEIDEAOF
reasonably accept those reasons." JOHNRAWLS,THELAWOF PEOPLES
PUBLIC
REASONREVISITED
137 (1999).
149
Kant declares that the concept of freedom is "the keystone of the whole architecture
KANT, CRITIQUE
OF PRACTICAL
REASON118
of the system of pure reason." IMMANUEL
(1949), Henry Allison notes that the concept of transcendental freedom-"an explicitly
indeterminist . . . conception (requiring an independence of determination by all
antecedent causes in the phenomenal world)" is at the heart of all of Kant's major
writings. HENRYALLISON,KANT'S THEORYOF FREEDOM1 (1990). Rousseau also
attributes the change from creature of impulse to one who obeys the laws of a civil
society as a transition from enslavement to one's appetites to "moral liberty," which
"makes man truly the master of himself." JEANJACQUESROUSSEAU,
ON THE SOCIAL
ON THE ORIGINOF EQUALITY,DISCOURSE
ON POLITICAL
CONTRACT:DISCOURSE
27 (Donald A. Cress trans.,) (1983).
ECONOMY,
'41
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not he but the German State intended to commit the atrocities for which
he stood accused.150The issue then becomes the degree of responsibility
individuals must bear for reprobate conduct when their nation sanctions
and even requires such behavior.

2. Responsibility and First and Second Order Desires
Harry Frankfurt offers a useful heuristic for analyzing free will
through which we can examine the influence of one's surroundings on
the ability to self-evaluate conduct. Frankfurt breaks the process of
conscious action into first and second order desires. First-order desires
include temptations to commit criminal acts-from shoplifting to serial
rape. Second-order desires involve deciding whether to act on one's first
Second-order desires are a prerequisite for
order desires.151
"personhood in Frankfurt's schema.'52 Free will involves integrating
one's behavior with one's second-order desires.153
When the prevailing cultural milieu encourages behavior that
deviates from commonly held norms, it inhibits second-order judgment.
People cannot assess the suitability of their first-order desires because
the better options are illegal andlor censored. Responsibility for any
resulting criminal intent is therefore mitigated.154 Under these

I5O As Michael Ignatieff observes, Hitler's Germany as well as Stalinist Russia were
structured to eliminate the idea that government violence was problematic. "Far from
being evils, Hitler's . . . acts of extermination were heralded as necessary to the creation
IGNATIEFF, THELESSER
EVIL:POLITICAL
ETHICSIN AN AGEOF
of a utopia . . ." MICHAEL
TERROR16 (2004).
151
See Hany G , Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE
WILL322 (Gary Watson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). Frankfurt's construct resembles
the principle of first and second order observation in cybernetics. First order observation
involves observing something and second order observation involves observing one's
observation. Since observation constitutes a form of participation, second order
observation validates the Uncertainty Principle. One can never know the degree to
which one's participation (through observation) affects an experiment.
152 See id. at 323-24. ("No animal other than man . . . appears to have the capacity for
reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.").
'53 See id. at 330. ("It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is
capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will.").
154 See FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5, at 175-76 ("By . . . restricting the
range of morally appealing options, the state deprives its citizens o f . . . the possibility of
critical moral self-assessment. . . . It betrays its duty to create circumstances of moral
action, and it bears part of the guilt for the crimes that result.").
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conditions, the agency of the citizen-agents is compromised, though not
eliminated.155
Frankfurt's scheme offers a compelling argument for mitigating the
guilt of actors who live in nations with a system of laws that encourage
aberrant behavior. However, his framework does not work in a domestic
legal context where, for example, a corporation stands accused of
violating normatively acceptable national laws.Is6 As Fletcher observes,
an immoral climate "require[s] teachers, religious leaders, politicians,
policies of the state, and a network of supportive laws."157 Even then
"the people constituting the society bear some of the

3. The Nature of the "We-Intention"
In the corporate context, a culture of lawlessness can exist within the
entity, as was arguably the case with ~ n d e r s e n , ' but
~ ~ most of
Frankfurt's other criteria, especially the policies of state and the network
of supportive laws, are missing. In smaller collectives, which are subject
to laws that are presumably just (rather than creators of laws that are
See id. at 176 ("The crimes [committed by Eichrnann, among others] expressed not
only their personal guilt but also the collective guilt of those who deprived the offenders
of their second-order critical sensibilities."). Fletcher inexplicably includes Timothy
McVeigh among those whose sensibilities were thus constrained, an assertion which
does not seem to comport with the logic of his argument.
The notion of normative acceptability is both fluid and problematic since norms vary
from nation to nation and do not stay static over time. However, in this context I am
referring to what Hugo Grotius called the rules of Reason, which limit what governments
can legitimately do and how they may act toward one another. Rules based on Reason
are natural rather than positive and binding even in the absence of any God. See BRIAN
BIX, JURISPRUDENCE:
THEORYAND CONTEXT71 ((1996). Robert George offers the
useful phrase "moral ecology" to describe the normative system of the community. See
ROBERTGEORGE,MAKINGMEN MORAL:CIVILLIBERTIES
AND PUBLICMORALITY 1
(1993) (suggesting that laws should "preserve the moral ecology in which people make
their morally self-constituting choices").
Fletcher, ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5 , at 175.
Is8 Id. Fletcher is discussing rationales for mitigating the guilt for living in a nation that
show
encourages the banality of evil. I adapt his argument for a related purpose-to
that the above-described constraints on second-order decision-making as well as the
national approbation of illicit acts do not exist in a domestic criminal context.
See generally, TOFFLER
supra note 8; SQUIRES
ET AL., Supra note 7, at 115-1 18. Both
books discuss the firm's metamorphosis from a paragon of virtue in the industry to a
place where fraud and conflicts of interest were viewed as inevitable parts of doing
HUFFINGTON,
business; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also ARIANNA
PIGS AT THE TROUGH:HOW CORPORATEGREEDAND POLITICAL
CORRUPTION
ARE
UNDERMINING
AMERICA
191-94 (2003) (describing how Andersen's firm culture led it on
a "long road to ruin.").
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unjust), second-order decision-making is not fatally compromised.
Individuals must take responsibility for their actions and so too must the
c ~ l l e c t i v e . ' The
~ ~ reason for the collective responsibility in this instance
lies with what John Searle calls "we-intention."
Searle believes that collective intentions are a product of selfconscious interdependence. If there exists a reciprocal understanding
within a group as to what the group will do-be it playing a game or
passing a law-then any ensuing actions are collective in nature and
result from a collective wi11.161 That collective will-r
"weintentionyy-is distinct from the aggregated will of the group members
because of the interdependence of the decisional process.'62
The corporate "we-intention" differs markedly from its national
counterpart. A firm's culture might encourage illegal behavior but the
laws of the nation assumedly do not.163 There is ample opportunity for
corporate agents to recognize that they are acting wronghlly.
Consequently, their ability to knowingly intend their behavior is
unaffected by their corporate affiliation. The distinction between a

I6O Even those who advocate most strongly for collective responsibility as a morally
distinct phenomenon acknowledge that collective actions result from individual
initiatives. The end result of those aggregated initiatives, however, is an entity
consciousness that is distinct from the sum of its parts. See, e.g. LARRYMAY, THE
GROUP-BASEDHARM AND
MORALITYOF GROUPS: COLLECTIVERESPONSIBILITY,
CORPORATE
RIGHTS3 (1987) (arguing that "social groups should be given a moral status
different from that of the discrete individual persons who compose them" but
acknowledging that while the "relationships [within a social group] make for different
acts, intentions, and interests than would exist outside the group, nonetheless they are
supra
relationships of individual persons.") (emphasis in original). See also FRIEDMAN,
note 94, at 852 ("[Als a matter of law, corporations have the capacity to express
judgments and attitudes that may be entirely unrelated to the personal views of their
owners, managers and employees . . . . Consequently, the corporation qua corporation
can suffer moral condemnation for its wrongdoing through criminal conviction and
punishment. . .").
16' JOHNR. SEARLE,THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SOCIALREALITY23-26 (1995); see also
Daniel R. Fishel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGALSTUD.3 19,323 (1996)
(describing corporations as "webs of contractual relationships consisting of individuals
who band together for their mutual economic benefit.").
'62
See SEARLE,supra note 159, at 24-25 ("The crucial element in collective
intentionality is a sense of doing . . . something together, and the individual intentionality
that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they
share.")(emphasis in original).
'63 For evidence of this, one need look no further than 18 U.S.C. 5 1512 (2002), the
statute under which Andersen was prosecuted.
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national culture of evil and a conupt corporate culture is examined more
fully be10w.I~~
4. Romanticism, Individualism & Associated Will

Collective national guilt is predicated on Associated Will, wherein a
nation becomes entified through the collective will of its populace. The
nation emerges as more than just the aggregated wills of the citizenry; it
is an actor itself, born of a national gestalt.'65 Professor Fletcher
contends that though the phenomenon of Associated Will predates
Romanticism, it is nevertheless a quintessentially Romantic construct.
He contrasts it with the prevailing vision of liberal individualism that
predominates within our legal system.
Romantics view the individual as the fount of genius, the source of
transformative emotions and the transcendence of the human condition.
Each individual is unique and wondrous. Liberal individualists, by
contrast, see equality as the governing principle of the human condition.
"Liberals from Adam Smith to Immanuel Kant thought about individuals
as created in much the same form. . . . [Tlhe crowning achievement of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment was Thomas Jefferson's effort to
bring all individuals under a single formula of moral equality.,7166
According to Fletcher, Romantics tend toward expansionist
thinking; liberal individualists are reductionist.16' A liberal would view
the Iraq War as a conflict between two nations with divergent interests
while a Romantic might see it as a struggle for democracy in the Middle
East. Similarly, a Romantic might view bread as the staff of life, rich
with history and portent whereas a liberal would see a grain-based
chemical phenomenon that is extraordinary for its marriage of
ingredients and the chemical reaction that merged them. 168
Romantics view collective identity as the transcendence of self and
the apotheosis of the human ~ 0 n d i t i o n . IThey
~ ~ embrace movements as
See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
See Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5.
166
FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5, at 35-36; Fletcher, Storrs Lectures,
supra note 5 at 1507-08. Thomas Jefferson's pronouncement in the Declaration of
Independence that "all men are created equal" exemplifies the liberal vision moral
equality.
16' Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5 , at 1508-09.
168
See id. at 1508.
169 FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR, supra note 5, at 36 ("Romantics are drawn to
movements, to crusades, and finally to armed conflicts.").
165
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the expression of mass identity and are drawn to armed conflict as the
means through which to ennoble h~manity.'~'Lord Byron's passionate
adoption of the struggle for Greek independence, a cause that eventually
cost him his life, epitomizes this Romantic worldview.
Associated Will is the expression of this unified collective identity.
It gains meaning through a shared culture and sense of purpose and has
substantial functionality as a means of expressing entity responsibility in
the international context. If national culture fosters and permits behavior
that violates international norms, then the nation-as-collective may also
be judged.17'
Necessarily, entity prosecutions of this type are external - one nation
is called to account by other nations in an international forum. Nations
can neither prosecute themselves nor indict their citizens for obeying the
country's own laws. Only in extra-ordinary legal times, as with the
Eichmann case, could a citizen be called to account by an international
court for crimes allegedly committed in his home country. 172
C. NATIONAL
VS. CORPORATE COLLECTIVE
GUILT

It makes sense to treat nations as actors on the international stage
and to treat citizens acting according to the national will as
representatives of that will. It likewise seems sensible at the domestic
level to treat partnerships and corporations as entities that exist separate
and apart from the aggregated wills of their agents.'73 This is the
essence of corporate identity.
Corporate identities do not change with a shifting membership.
Their behavior must be must viewed in the context of what French calls
the "Corporation's Internal Decision Structure," or "CID," which
subordinates individual intentions within the corporate decisional

I7O

Id. at 36.

See ARENDT,supra note 141.
Eichmann's case was made all the more extraordinary for the circumstances of his
arrest and trial. He was kidnapped by the Israeli Secret Service and handed over to the
War Crimes Tribunal. The fact that a foreign national could be treated in this manner is
itself testimony to the fact that prosecution takes precedence over typical civil liberties
when dealing with war crimes. See id. at 240. See also United States Holocaust
Museum Archive, http://www.ushmm.org-(last visited Sep. 19, 2005).
'73 See supra note 8 1 and accompanying text.
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matrix.'74
Nonetheless, the differences between nations and
corporations and their respective milieus are stark and have important
legal consequences.
Nations enact laws that bind the populace. Assuming an autocratic
government, citizens have little opportunity to amend or object to those
laws. They must obey or face punishment. If adherence to the nation's
laws violates international norms, then the juridical response to that
violation must be international as well.
Crimes committed under such a regime are endemic to the nation
and exemplify the banality of evil. They arise from a culture of evil
buttressed by a supportive legal system. Individual responsibility is
mitigated by the nation's collective accountability for forcing its citizens
to choose between obeying unjust laws and facing potentially
catastrophic penalties.'75 Any prosecution must acknowledge the
nation's complicity in the wrongful conduct. To do otherwise would
ignore the fact that the defendant could not hlly exercise her second
order decision-making faculties and that she faced punishment for
disobedience to the nation's laws.
Even if one accepts that in a culture of evil the nation bears some
responsibility for its citizens' actions, citizens nevertheless retain a level
. ' ~ ~will survives even under adverse condition^.'^^
of a c ~ o u n t a b i l i t ~Free
One can, afier all, choose not to obey-accepting the consequences as
preferable to obeying unjust laws. International law recognizes this
premise. For example, the Nuremburg Court rejected Eichmann's

'74 See FRENCH,
supra note 56, at 39-41. French argues that the CID demonstrates that
corporations must be viewed as intentional actors and that actions done in conformity
with corporate policy fulfill the corporation's desires. See id. at 44.
'71 See Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5, at 1541-44.
176 See Frankfurt, supra note 14, at 167-76. ("[Bleing coerced does not exclude being
morally responsible. . . . [Cloercion affects the judgment of a person's moral
responsibility only when the person acts as he does because he is coerced to do so - i.e.,
when the fact that he is coerced is what accounts for his action." Frankfurt's thesis is
that there are many circumstances (and Eichrnann's may be among them) where a person
is required to do something he would have done anyway. In those circumstances the
coercion plays little or no part in the decision to act, regardless of the lack of alternatives.
At such times, the actor is no less morally responsible than if the coercive circumstances
did not exist. Frankfurt does not reject the possibility that coercion can mitigate moral
responsibility- just that it need not always do so.
'77 See id.
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defense and convicted him.'78 Subsequent international treaties hold
individuals accountable as we11.I7'
The only instance where a nation potentially bears full responsibility
for individual actions involves the behavior of soldiers. Soldiers who
disobey orders face court martial, imprisonment, and/or death. As
Foucault observes, soldiers are trained to become "political puppets,
small scale models of power."lgO The methods of training, discipline and
coercion make "possible the meticulous control of the operations of the
body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
upon them a relation of docility-utility . . . .~ ~ 1 8 1On the battlefield,
soldiers who refuse orders face penalties up to and including summary
execution.Ig2 Unlike corporate actors or private citizens living under an
illegal regime, soldiers' obedience is involuntary and any resulting
actions are attributable to the nation that conscripted thern.Ig3
Clearly, Andersen employees did not face such draconian
consequences for failing to adhere to corporate standards. At worst, they
faced dismissal. However, the culture at Andersen did play a large role
in its downfall. The firm had a distinct identity that transcended the
I7'See ARENDT,supra note 141, at 245,257.
17' The international consensus on this issue has shifted over the last century. The 192 1
Treaty of Leipzig allowed the existence of superior orders to negate the guilt of the
subordinate who followed them. Thus, for example, the crew of U-Boat that sank a
hospital ship during WWI was acquitted of wrongdoing because they were following
their captain's orders. The tribunals of the 1940s rejected this defense and convicted the
crew of a WWII era U-Boat that machine-gunned the survivors of a steamer it had
torpedoed to prevent them from revealing the whereabouts of the submarine. The 1998
Rome Treaty governing the new International Criminal Court, which rejects the notion
that orders from a superior form a defense to guilt but allows that ignorance of the
illegality of the conduit can mitigate punishment. See Sheppard, supra note 138, at 76364 and n.53-54; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 33, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 18319
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm(last visited Sept. 11,
2005) (stating same).
Ig0 MICHELFOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE
& PUNISH:THE BIRTHOF THE PRISON136 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975).
Is' Id. at 137.
Ig2 See PAULF. BOLLER,
JR., PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 45 (1984). (detailing the
execution of six militiamen for desertion, with General Andrew Jackson's approval,
during the Creek War in 1813).
Ig3
According to Rousseau, "[wlar is not . . . a relationship between one man and
supra note 147, at
another, but a relationship between one state and another." ROUSSEAU,
21. Soldiers at war ceask to function as citizens of the society and become its defenders.
They act not as individuals but as servants of the state. Id.
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aggregate of its individual employees and created a milieu with its own
norms and guidelines.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of corporate identity remains distinct
from Associated Will. A corporation's rules of employment must be
subordinate to and in compliance with the laws of the nation. Corporate
individuality therefore exists only within normative parameters
established by the incorporating nation. Nations, as the societal lawmaking body, do not have any such constraints. Consequently, national
identity1Associated Will is a discreet phenomenon from that of a
corporation. Understanding how the two concepts differ is crucial to
comprehending the nature of the government's error in the Andersen
trial, as well as the dangers that the error poses going forward.

Andersen had a distinct corporate identity. Its identity grew out of
its founder's personality and evolved into something he scarcely would
have recognized. The firm's culture exercised powerful influence over
its employees (hence the term, "Androids") and created an atmosphere
that tolerated and even seemed to encourage illegal behavior.
In this sense, the culture at Andersen resembled Associated ~ i 1 1 . l ' ~
Its identity, though distinct from the individuals that made up the
collective, was inseparable from their aggregated will. Nevertheless,
there are important reasons why the Andersen culture differs from
Associated Will. Those differences become especially significant when
assessing entity guilt in domestic criminal prosecutions.

I . Corporations Do Not Make Law
Corporations are products of the legal system of the nation where
they reside.'" They exist because of the society's laws and are likewise
bound by them.lS6 Unlike nations, corporations cannot legislate and
have no legal authority over their agents. When an employee pledges
allegiance to a corporate employer, it is because the two entities (the
individual and the corporation) share a common goal. The corporation's
success theoretically redounds to the employee's benefit. If an
employee did not share this view she presumably would seek other
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
365 (8th ed. 2004).
ls6 Id. at 341 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518, 636
(18 19) (Marshall, J.)).
L84 See

'"
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employment. Enlisting in the corporation and subordinating individual
goals for the good of the corporation is voluntary. Merging individual
will with that of the corporate entity exemplifies self-conscious
interdependence rather than a constraint on free will.
Consequently, when an agent acts anti-socially but in compliance
with corporate desires, both agent and corporation are responsible. The
agent's culpability is self-evident; she acted with intention. Even as she
subsumed her individual goals to those of the collective, she retained
free will and agency and chose to act as she did.
Corporate responsibility stems from the fact that the agent's actions
aimed to fulfill corporate desires.'''
When an act undertaken by an
agent or agents of the corporation instantiate or implement a corporate
policy, then it follows that the act was done for corporate reasons. One
could then extrapolate that the act fulfilled a corporate desire."* It
follows that the corporation intended the act.ls9
However, the best interests of the corporation remain discreet from
the best interests of the agent who acted on the corporation's behalf.
That their respective interests align (in the sense that if the corporation
does well, the employee also benefits) does not make them identical.
Instead, the employee has subordinated her personal desires to the
collective desire of the corporation. Because corporate desires provided
the impetus for her action, the corporation shares responsibility for its
consequences.

2. Corporations Are Subject to the Law
Corporate desire can sometimes appear more culpable than the
action itself. In 1980, Ford Motor Company was tried in Indiana for
reckless homicide stemming from a fatal car crash.Ig0 Prosecutors
claimed that the automaker had failed to warn consumers that the
placement of the Ford Pinto's fuel tank behind the rear axle posed a
severe fire hazard in the event of a rear end collision. The case
foundered when a document from the civil trial was ruled inadmissible.
The document allegedly showed that the company calculated the costs of
retrofitting the vehicle ($137 million) outweighed the benefits in human
18' I use the term "corporate desire" in the same manner that French does - to denote a
product of the CID. FRENCH,
supra note 56, at 44.

See id.
Is9 See id. at 52.
I9O

State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 25 14 (Ind. Super. 1979).
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lives saved (calculated at $49.5 million with an average life valued at
$200,000).191
Ultimately, Ford was acquitted largely because the prosecution
could not introduce a document crucial to demonstrating the company's
criminal intent. Similarly, Andersen's conviction was overturned
because the jury could not properly assess the firm's criminal intent.
In the end, neither Andersen nor Ford was found criminally liable,
with each case turning on the prosecution's inability to demonstrate
intent. That neither prosecution succeeded is indicative more of how
difficult it is to prove collective intent than that such intent does not
exist. It does not necessarily point to any deficiency with the
methodology for proving corporate guilt.
While corporations can be held accountable for their agents' actions,
entity responsibility does not diminish the agency of individual agents.
Guilt at the corporate level is not a zero-sum equation. This contrasts
with the national phenomenon wherein anti-social behavior is legal
andlor required, creating a culture of evil wherein people lack sufficient
data to inform their behavior. Under such circumstances, individual
responsibility is mitigated commensurate with the responsibility of the
nation.'92

E. ENTITY GUILT- SECOND VS. FIRSTORDER
DECISION MAKING
We can differentiate between corporate collective responsibility and
Associated Will by applying Frankfurt's first and second order decisionmaking m0de1.l~~At the national level, a culture of evil impedes (but
does not abrogate) citizens' ability to engage in second-order decisionmaking which involves evaluating temptations that arise from first-order
19' The prosecution was unsuccessful, likely due in large part to the State's inability to
introduce the offending document. Ford retains the dubious distinction of being the first
and only corporation in American history to face criminal prosecution for homicide.
Revisiting the case a decade later, Gary Schwartz argues that the document is not nearly
as damning as is widely believed. In his view, a closer analysis of both the documentary
evidence and the context in which it was prepared casts at least some doubt on the idea
that the company recklessly disregarded the potential human costs that could result from
the car's design. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGER~
L. REV. 1013, 1016-23 (1991).
19' In this way, according to Sheppard, "the individual and the nation both remain
morally responsible, and the values of the Enlightenment are not altogether extinguished
by application of the Romantic ethic." Sheppard, supra note 138 at 764.
193 See Frankfurt, supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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desires. Without the normative compass that a just legal system
provides, citizens lack an important means through which to assess
temptation and determine a proper course of action. Even if they
understand that complying with the law would be normatively wrong,
they nevertheless face criminal penalties for failing to do so.
By contrast, corporate corruption leads to increased Jirst-order
temptations. When a corporation pressures an employee to behave
illicitly, the increased first-order temptation complicates the secondorder evaluation process. However, the employee's world is not
confined to her corporate affiliation. She remains bound by society's
laws-the
same laws binding the corporation. When considering
whether to act on her first-order desires, she can and should evaluate
their conformity with prevailing law. If she does, she will realize that
the contemplated behavior is illegal and that she should refrain.
The crucial difference between corporate culture and Associated
Will, then, is that a corporation cannot create a culture of evil.
Corporations are subject to the laws of the incorporating nation. So long
as the nation's laws do not condone illegal behavior, there exists no
systemic illegality. Therefore, though corporate employees may face
increased first-order temptations, they have no excuse for not engaging
in the second-order evaluation that ought to inhibit acting on first order
desires. If they act anyway, they must bear responsibility for doing so.
The corporation must likewise accept responsibility for its desires
having created the first-order temptation.

Andersen was a corporate entity functioning within a society, rather
than a society h c t i o n i n g within an international community. Andersen
employees therefore retained their second order faculties. Though a
discrete entity under the law, the firm did not and could not function
separately from its agents. lg4
When facing criminal trial, Andersen was entitled to the same legal
protections enjoyed by other legal "persons," including due process and
jury unanimity. The issue posed in Note # 9 dealt with the nature of
corporate criminality and entity due process. Faced with jury skepticism
as to the responsible Andersen agent, the court retooled corporate

'"

Brief of Anderson, supra note 96, at 1-2.
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criminal law to enable conviction without consensus.'95~s
a result of the
judge's ruling, the jury was permitted to consider convicting without
having agreed on the crime, much less the responsible agent. Even if
each member of the jury had believed that a different person did a
different thing, they still could have convicted Andersen of obstruction
of justice.
The judge apparently accepted the prosecution's argument that
Andersen's entity responsibility should be expanded and its agents'
agency contracted. The ruling effectively treated Andersen as a rogue
nation facing an international tribunal rather than as a corporate citizen
in a United States court. As such, it violated Andersen's due process
rights and set a disturbing precedent for future trials.
CONCLUSION & POSTCRIPT

1) In the Andersen trial, the collective guilt rationale advanced by
the prosecution and allowed by the judge in response to Jury Note # 9
was constitutionally and logically wrong. Jury unanimity is required for
conviction. This means that the jury must agree on the intent and the
act. Note # 9 showed that the jury had not agreed on either one.
2) The trial judge made a serious error when she permitted the jury
to deliberate with the understanding that it did not need to reach
consensus regarding the nature of the crime. Attributing responsibility
for an agent's actions to a domestic corporate entity is unworkable,
unnecessary, and violates due process.
3) Andersen's culture was dysfunctional and led to myriad instances
of its ill-serving the public. Andersen the entity must bear some
responsibility for its wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the wrongful acts
committed by Andersen were carried out by agents acting consciously
and manifesting their own intent. The firm's complicity neither negates
nor replaces agent responsibility.
4) The prosecution's response to the jury's query inappropriately
injected a component of international entity prosecutions into a domestic
criminal trial. Only nations can create societies and systems of laws that
sanction criminal behavior. Under such systems, free will is critically
compromised.
195

Landsman, supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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It is worth considering why, when faced with such formidable legal
barriers, Andersen prosecutors employed the strategy they did as well as
why the judge embraced it. They effectively propounded a theory of
guilt based on Associated Will. Does this mean that the prosecutors at
the Department of Justice and a sitting federal judge have turned into
Romantics? In a sense, perhaps they have - not personally, but rather
as representatives of a government that favors large-scale movements,
appeals to patriotism, and crusades against e ~ i 1 . l ~ ~
The court's ruling epitomizes a willingness to sacrifice basic
liberties for the perceived greater good of public safety. This mindset
normally occurs during national emergencies, especially during wartime.
However, the nation is not at war in the traditional sense. Instead, it has
declared war on an array of incorporeal forms and notions, including
terrorism, drugs, crime, illiteracy, and poverty. 197
The widespread use of the rhetoric of war-a tendency that has
intensified in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks4reates an
atmosphere wherein procedural safeguards become de-emphasized in the
name of public safety. This policy is self-undermining and dangerous,
particularly since the nation is no more at war with crime than with any
other abstra~ti0n.I~~

Ig6
'91

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

That is not to say that the United States has been reluctant to wage war on defined
entities such as nations. In the last quarter-century alone, the US has been involved in
military actions in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Nonetheless, the "declaration of war" as a method of formalizing hostilities between
nations appears to have lost currency in recent years. As discussed infia, the declaration
of war once served as a formal signal that transformed the status of a country, both
within and without, from the rules of peace to the rules of war. See Fletcher, ROMANTICS
AT WARsupra note 5, at 46-48. Though global conflicts are no less frequent today, one
sees fewer and fewer declarations of war between nations. For example, the United
States has not formally declared war on any nation since 1941. Ironically though, on the
domestic front, the US declares war so often that the term has lost much of its meaning.
Between the wars on poverty, drugs, illiteracy, crime and terrorism, among others, the
nation is either in a state of constant belligerence or delusion.
Ig8 See Leonard Cassuto, The Power of Words,The Chron. Rev., Sept. 28,2001, at B13.
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The American obsession with war199has assumed enormous political
and legal importance in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the conjoined "wars" on crime and
terror.200 The nation has entified and made enemies of sociological
phenomena.201
This rhetoric of war has wrought considerable changes on the
American legal landscape, including increased obstacles to death penalty
appeals202 "three strikes and you're out" laws203 and the use of the
military to interdict and participate in the ancillary "War on D ~ U ~ S . " * ~ ~

199

HOW
See generally, ANDREWJ. BACEVICH,THE NEW AMERICANMILITARISM:
AMERICANS
ARE SEDUCED
BY WAR(2005). As Tony Judt observes in his review essay of
Bacevich's book, the United States spends more on defense than the entire rest of the
world combined, it is the only country where soldiers are omnipresent in political photo
ops, movies and television, and civilians queue up to buy expensive faux military
vehicles. Tony Judt, The New World Order, 52 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS12, 16 (2005)
J. BACEVICH,THE NEWAMERICAN
MILITARISM:
HOW AMERICANS
(reviewing ANDREW
ARE SEDUCED
BY WAR(2005)).
There is considerable irony in the fact that for the past sixty years-years during
which the nation has engaged in at least seven military conflicts on foreign soil-the
only wars the United States has actually declared have been on domestic social ills.
201
The propensity to declare war against ideas and social ills is over half a century old
and arguably started with the "Cold War" against the spread of communism. In his
farewell address to the nation in 1953, President Truman, speaking of the Cold War, said
"I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing
struggle-this conflict between those who love freedom and those who would lead the
world back into slavery and darkness." The President's Farewell Address to the
American People, 1952-1953, in Bruce Ackerman, Response: This is Not a War, 113
YALEL.J. 1871, 1872 at n.2 (2004). Ackerman also cites presidential speeches from the
1960s (declaring the "unconditional war on poverty") and the 1980s (declaring war on
drugs and organized crime, respectively). Id.
None of the "enemies" in these "wars" show any sign of conceding. David Frum wryly
observed that the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan "was an officer in the War on Poverty,
the War on Drugs, the War on Crime [and] the War on Cancer . . . a series of debacles
beside which the military history of Italy begins to look impressive." David Frum, The
Nov. 1996, at 74.
Tory From New York, AM. SPECTATOR,
202
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214.
203
See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. $ 355(9)(c) (1995); Ark. Code Ann. $ 5-4-501(d)(l) (2005); Cal.
Penal Code $ 999e (Deering 2005).
204 Following Randolph Bourne, who observed that war is the health of the state (he was
speaking of World War I), David Kopel and Paul M. Blackman observe that "[tlhe drug
war has been the health of the military state, and may in the long run be the death of the
Constitution." David Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The
Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRONL. REV.
619,656 (1997).
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Following September 11, a new front was opened and the war(s)
inten~ified.~'~
War now infuses all aspects of American society, both international
and domestic. Internationally, the "Global War on Terror" informs
every aspect of American foreign policy--even though it is a war
against no known enemy and has no foreseeable end. It follows that if
the United States continues on its present course, it will remain on a war
footing with most of the world indefinitely.
Not only do these "concept wars" involve no defined enemy, they
also do not involve the laws of war. The body of rules that govern during
wartime is known as "jus in bellow and differs markedly from the laws
that govern a democracy during peacetime.206The state of war involves
its own normative structure and rules.207 As Fletcher observes, the
peacetime legal system where citizens enjoy many rights against the
state and few reciprocal duties is replaced with a war regime where
citizens, like soldiers, have many duties and few rights.208
The United States currently seeks to have it both ways. It has
assumed a permanent war footing but does not treat the purported enemy
as a wartime foe. For example, captured prisoners in Guantanamo Bay
and elsewhere are "unlawful combatants" lacking the rights afforded

'OS The rhetoric of a "War on Terror" is not new. It dates at least as far back as 1984,
when President Reagan described the United States' counter-terrorism policy as a "war
against terrorism." See Sheppard, supra note 138 at 753 n.lO. However, the
government response to the September 11 attacks transformed the endeavor into a full
scale military operation.
'06 See MICHAEL
WALZER,JUSTAND UNJUSTWARS, 21 (3rd ed. Basic Books 2000)
AT WAR,supra note 5 at 47.
(1977); FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
'07 For example, the Enemy Alien Act, 50 U.S.C $5 21-24 (2002) gives the government
special powers over aliens during wartime In Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948),
the Court upheld the Act and in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court
held that enemy aliens captured on the field of battle had no right to challenge their
subjection to military trial. However, as David Cole notes, "the 'enemy alien' rule
applies only in a time of declared war and only to citizens of the country with which we
are at war." DAVID COLE,ENEMYALIENS12 (2003) (emphasis in original). Recent
jurisprudence has made clear that the scope of presidential authority has been greatly
expanded through Congress's enactment of the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Joint Resolution (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See also infra
note 208.
'08 FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS
AT WAR,supra note 5 at 47.
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under international law.209Yet, they were captured as part of a military
operation and detained because they pose a threat to national security.
Domestically, the impact has been equally drastic, including
indefinite detention of American citizens, laws permitting increased
domestic surveillance provisions,20s and other initiatives designed to
safeguard public safety at the expense of personal freedoms. The upshot
is that though the United States is currently engaged in military action in
two foreign countries, it does not adhere to the accepted jus in bello.
Yet, it shows no similar compunction about invoking the exigencies of
wartime to justify suspending or lessening domestic civil liberties.
Amidst this hodgepodge of war and peace, it should not surprise that
a tactic of war crime prosecutions has found its way into a domestic
criminal trial. In a sense, the illogic of the Andersen prosecution
amounts to a tacit indictment of the "wars" on crime and terror. The
American legal system is a delicate equipoise of rights and obligations.
Importing rhetoric that deprivileges rights threatens the system's core
function.
War is quintessentially a political act whose goal is to effectuate
systemic political change through force of arms. It presupposes a foe
dedicated to opposing that change. Crime is both a creation of law and
combated by the forces of law. Those who would make war on crime do
not wish fundamental change but rather to strengthen the status quo.
Criminals similarly seek only to improve their situation within the social
system; they do not seek wholesale systemic change. A war on crime is
therefore incoherent by definition.
If recourse to the laws of society is possible, then the conflict
involves law enforcement rather than war.209If there is no war, then
there is no entity1Associated Will whose allegiance to a foreign set of
209 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d. 386, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding the President
possesses authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force to detain an
enemy combatant). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 5 19 (2004) ("There is no
bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.").
208 See, e.g., Pub. L. No 107-56, 5, 215 (2001) (enabling the FBI to demand a patron's
borrowing records at the library under the Patriot Act).
209 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 444, 491 (1990) ("Real war permitssometimes requires-relaxation
of restraints on governmental action; law
enforcement-investigation, arrest, trial, sentence, punishment-is law, not war, and
therefore a reflection of our values--our peacetime, abiding values.").
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laws and norms makes it the enemy. The rules of engagement that
govern during an armed conflict are therefore neither necessary nor
relevant. 210

A war on "terror" has marginally more coherence because terrorism
constitutes an attack on politics itself. It aims at effectuating systemic
change through random violence. However, though society must defend
itself against terrorists, it remains impossible to make war on terror, an
amorphous concept that spans national and political allegiances.
Terrorism, like crime, lacks a unifying consciousness against which to
focus hostilities. Without agents who self-identify, declare allegiance to
a means or ideal, and attempt to carry out actions aimed at
accomplishing those ideals, terrorism remains an abstraction.
Terrorists, once identified, constitute an enemy, but this only begins
a complex analysis. What if the terrorist acts alone, or with a few
accomplices? Is the nation at war with a couple of people? How many
terrorists must band together before they become a collective entity
against whom a nation can wage war? The answers to such questions
are far from obvious.211
Agents carrying out terrorist actions against the state are belligerents
of a type. However, they occupy a limbic space between domestic and
war criminals. The mechanics of their prosecution, including a
determination of the types of rights to which they are entitled, presents
210

General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently complained
that the phrase "war on terror" was counterproductive because it presupposed a military
solution. Shortly thereafter, on Aug. 3, 2005, President Bush emphatically declared that
it was a "war," using the word thirteen times in a forty-seven minute speech that was
primarily on domestic initiatives. Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear:
Phrase is 'War on Terror, ' N . Y .TIMES,Aug. 4,2005, at A12; Dan Froomkin, War: The
Metaphor, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontentlblog/2005/08/04/BL2005080400971
.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2005)
(chronicling the Administration's struggle with the phrase "war on terror" coupled with
its unwillingness to bear the political cost of abandoning the rhetoric).
21 l
One commentator suggests viewing the war on terror as a "condition" rather than a
war. A condition refers to a more or less permanent state of affairs during which citizens
should make every effort to lead a normal life. This perspective fits with the Bush
Administration's recommendations that people get on with their lives and refuse to live
in a constant state of fear. If the struggle to suppress terrorism is, in fact, a condition to
which we should become accustomed, then "war-as-condition is a normal state of affairs,
not an emergency in which extraordinary measures might be appropriate. And the
normal constitutional rules ought to apply in normal conditions." Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties In Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
273,280 (2003).
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an ongoing challenge. But, similar to the Andersen case, it is impossible
to prosecute terrorism, much less wage war upon it, without identifying
the specific individuals whose will and actions give it shape.212
The conclusions of this article are twofold. First, the Andersen
prosecution and the trial judge erred when they respectively the idea that
the jury could treat the firm as an entity capable of its own intent,
separate and apart from the intentions and actions of its agents. One can
prosecute nations or individuals for national crimes in times where
typical civil liberties and constitutional protections are suspended. That
was not, nor should it have been, the case here.
Second, the Andersen trial occurred during a time of unprecedented
erosion of civil liberties and the placement of the country on a
permanent war footing. The events of the trial are serious in their own
right as an issue of due process. But they also form part of a larger, far
more serious issue.
James Madison wrote in 1795 that "no nation can preserve its
freedom in the midst of continual warfare."213 Madison's admonition
has little traction today. In 2004, President Bush declared that: "[tlhis
country must go on the offensive and stay on the offensive."214 The
impacts of this ongoing state of war now permeate the legal

2'2 Bruce Ackerman offers the sobering observation that making war on amorphous ideas
will inevitably lead to increased wars on sovereign states: "[Olnce the public is
convinced that a larger 'war on terrorism' is going on, these separate wars can be
re ackaged as mere 'battles."' Ackerman, supra note 199, at 1876.
"'JAMES MADISON,
POLITICAL
OBSERVATIONS,LETTERS AND OTHERWRITINGSOF JAMES
MADISON,
VOL.IV 49 1 (1 795).
214 Judt, supra note 197. The idea of a constant offensive was not new to the Bush
Administration. As far back as 1987, the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment had this to say about the "war on Drugs": "If the war on drugs is to be
successful, the character of that war will need to be broadly understood. Perhaps the
most important thing to recognize is that there will be no clean, clear victory. The enemy
ASSESSMENT,
will not surrender, fold his tent and return home." OFFICEOF TECHNOLOGY
CONGRESSIONAL
BOARD,NTIS ORDER #PB87-184 172, THEBORDERWARON DRUGS17
(March, 1987), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu~ota~Ota~3DATNl987/8702.PDF.
2'5 In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the nation that "overgrown
military establishments are . . . particularly hostile to republican liberty." See Greg
Guma, Addicted to War: An Insider Examines the Seductive Myths of Militarism,
COMMON
DREAMS
NEWS
CENTER,
June
24,
2005,
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0624-26 (last visited Aug. 12,2005).
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The resulting danger to liberty is real and worsening. The Allies in
World War I aspired to "make the world safe for democracy." The
current and ongoing state of war is having the opposite effect; it is
making democracy unsafe.
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